Union Pacific Railroad v. Stouffer
2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 15358
| Tex. App. | 2013Background
- November 15, 2012: a parade vehicle was struck at a railroad crossing in Midland, Texas, causing injuries and deaths.
- Plaintiffs Stouffer et al. filed suit in Dallas County against Smith Industries and Union Pacific Railroad Co. (Union Pacific).
- Smith allegedly has its principal place of business in Midland; Union Pacific is a foreign corporation with a claimed Dallas County principal office.
- Union Pacific moved to transfer venue to Midland; the trial court denied the motion and this interlocutory appeal followed.
- The appellate issue centers on whether the denial of a venue-transfer motion in a multi-plaintiff case is appealable under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.003(b).
- The court analyzes the Missouri Pacific principal-office test and whether plaintiffs independently established proper venue in Dallas County before allowing transfer to Midland.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 15.003(b)(1) jurisdiction exists here | Stouffer asserts jurisdiction under § 15.003(b)(1) for denial of transfer | Union Pacific argues no jurisdiction since not a proper interlocutory appeal | Jurisdiction exists; order is appealable under § 15.003(b)(1) |
| Dallas County venue proper as Union Pacific principal office | Plaintiffs show Dallas office as Union Pacific principal office with decision-makers in Texas | Union Pacific contends Dallas office lacks substantially equal authority statewide | Dallas not established as principal office; no substantial-equality showed |
| Remedy: transfer to Midland proper for all defendants | Venue proper in Dallas; request to transfer to Midland for all parties | Midland appropriate because Smith’s principal office is there and events occurred there | Midland County is proper; case to be transferred there under §15.005 |
| Dallas vs. Harris County structure and authority | Dallas employees Anderson and Cook are decision-makers with statewide authority | Evidence shows authority not substantially equal to Harris County executives | Dallas lacks substantial-equality; principal office not shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 998 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999) (principal office requires statewide authority comparison of decision makers and daily affairs)
- Shamoun & Norman, LLP v. Yarto International Group, LP, 398 S.W.3d 272 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2012) (post-2003 §15.003(b) broadens interlocutory venue appeal rights)
- Basic Energy Servs. GP, LLC v. Gomez, 398 S.W.3d 734 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2010) (limited interpretation of §15.003(b) rejected post-2003 amendments)
- Stewart v. Sanmina Texas, L.P., 156 S.W.3d 198 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005) (objections to evidence; implied rulings not equivalent to striking evidence)
- Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 886 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.1994) (burden shifting on venue after challenge to plaintiff's chosen county)
- In re Reynolds, 369 S.W.3d 638 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2012) (venue transfer in multi-defendant contexts; co-parties Commerce)