Union Pacific Railroad Co v. Taylor Truck Line Inc
3:15-cv-00074
W.D. La.Sep 13, 2017Background
- Union Pacific sued Taylor entities; consolidated cases in Western District of Louisiana concerning a railroad crossing accident and related tort claims.
- Union Pacific moved for partial summary judgment seeking a ruling that federal law preempts claims/defenses that it was negligent by failing to provide additional signs or signals (specifically a low ground‑clearance sign) at the crossing.
- The Court granted Union Pacific’s motion on July 13, 2017, holding federal preemption barred negligence claims/defenses premised on failure to provide additional warning/signals for low ground clearance.
- The Taylor Entities filed a Rule 54(b) motion asking the Court to reconsider, arguing low ground‑clearance signs are neither ‘‘active’’ nor ‘‘passive’’ warnings under federal law and that no federal regulation governs such signs, so state law should apply.
- The Taylor Entities alternatively requested clarification whether their expert may testify that trains should have reduced speed or removed the track from service until a low‑clearance sign was posted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Court should reconsider its interlocutory ruling preempting negligence claims about lack of low‑clearance signage | Union Pacific: No basis for reconsideration; prior ruling correct under federal preemption principles | Taylor Entities: Low clearance sign not covered by federal definitions; no federal regulation; state law governs negligence | Denied — no manifest error, new evidence, injustice, or intervening law; preemption ruling stands |
| Whether a low ground‑clearance sign falls within federally preempted warnings (active/passive) | Union Pacific: federal law preempts claims about additional warnings/signals | Taylor Entities: low clearance signs are outside active/passive definitions and thus not preempted | Implicitly held preempted by prior ruling; Taylor Ents’ reargument rejected |
| Whether Court must ‘‘clarify’’ whether Taylor’s expert may testify about required speed reduction or track removal | Union Pacific: clarification not warranted and beyond scope | Taylor Entities: seek explicit permission for expert testimony on speed/track removal absent signage | Denied — Ruling and Judgment already clear; separate ruling exists re: speed issue |
| Proper procedural vehicle for relief from interlocutory order | N/A: Court explains Rule 54(b) governs interlocutory reconsideration | Taylor Entities used Rule 54(b) motion | Court considered motion under Rule 54(b) standard and denied relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Iturralde v. Shaw Grp., Inc., [citation="512 F. App'x 430"] (5th Cir. 2013) (district court may reconsider interlocutory orders under its inherent power)
- Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1981) (district court authority to modify interlocutory orders)
- Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (interlocutory orders may be altered before final judgment)
- Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d 763 (5th Cir. 2017) (order granting partial summary judgment is interlocutory; Rule 54(b) governs reconsideration)