2019 Ohio 4877
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Union Local School District contracted with Fanning/Howey (architect) in 1995 and Grae‑Con (general contractor) in 1996 for construction/renovation of school buildings. Certificates of substantial completion placed completion in late 1997–1998.
- Defects (mold, water intrusion, odors, discolored walls) were discovered in 2008 following inspections and testing.
- The district filed suit in 2012 alleging breach of contract (workmanlike performance, warranties, industry standards); the complaint alleged only contract claims.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment under Ohio’s ten‑year construction statute of repose, R.C. 2305.131, which the trial court granted because the repose period ran from substantial completion in 1997–98 and the suit was filed after the repose and after the two‑year discovery extension.
- On appeal the Seventh District stayed the case pending Ohio Supreme Court guidance; the Supreme Court’s New Riegel decision held the current R.C. 2305.131 applies to contract claims as well as torts. The Seventh District (this opinion) affirms the trial court: the statute bars the district’s claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 2305.131 (ten‑year construction statute of repose) applies to contract claims | Kocisko controls: prior statute applied only to torts, so contract claims are governed by the 15‑year contract statute of limitations | The 2005 version materially differs from the prior statute; Supreme Court precedent (New Riegel) shows the current statute covers contract and tort claims | Court follows New Riegel and holds the current statute of repose applies to contract claims as well as torts |
| Whether a claim that accrued during the ten‑year repose period can nevertheless be barred (i.e., repose only bars accrual after ten years) | A cause of action that accrued within the ten‑year period should not be extinguished by the repose provision | The repose statute operates independently of accrual and can extinguish accrued but uncommenced claims; discovery/disability exceptions exist for late discovery | Argument was not preserved below and is waived; on the merits the court rejects it—R.C. 2305.131 is a true statute of repose that can extinguish accrued claims |
| Whether the 2005 statute is unconstitutional under Ohio’s right‑to‑remedy/open‑courts clause (Brennaman) | Brennaman found the earlier statute unconstitutional; the 2005 enactment has the same effect and therefore is unconstitutional | Brennaman applied to a different statutory text; the 2005 statute has significant changes (definitions, exceptions, savings provisions) and is presumptively constitutional | Court finds Brennaman not controlling on the re‑enacted statute, upholds constitutionality as the statute is materially different and entitled to a presumption of validity |
| Whether the district satisfied any repose exceptions (discovery/two‑year extension) | The district relied on discovery of defects in 2008 to extend the filing period | Defendants point out discovery occurred more than two years before the 2012 filing and repose had already expired; repose triggers from substantial completion in 1997–98 | Court finds substantial completion dates control, the discovery exception did not save the 2012 filing, and claims are time‑barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Kocisko v. Charles Shutrump & Sons Co., 21 Ohio St.3d 98 (Ohio 1986) (held former R.C. 2305.131 applied only to tort actions)
- Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co., 49 Ohio St.3d 193 (Ohio 1990) (interpreting former construction statute of repose)
- Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 70 Ohio St.3d 460 (Ohio 1994) (right‑to‑remedy challenge to prior statute; Court struck down prior enactment)
- Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 148 Ohio St.3d 483 (Ohio 2016) (explaining distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose; upheld repose in medical‑malpractice context)
- CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2014) (Supreme Court discussion of statutes of repose as legislative cutoffs that bar claims regardless of accrual)
- Groch v. General Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192 (Ohio 2008) (discussed stare decisis and prior reproach of Brennaman; adopted Sedar’s rationale)
- Oaktree Condo. Assn., Inc. v. Hallmark Bldg. Co., 139 Ohio St.3d 264 (Ohio 2014) (recognized repose can extinguish vested claims under certain statutes)