Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d 39

Background

Joseph Emmite, long-time insulator, died June 15, 2005; hospital records and a treating pulmonologist (Dr. Prince) diagnosed pulmonary asbestosis, but the death certificate listed dementia/Alzheimer’s. The Emmites (his estate/family) sued Union Carbide in June 2007 for wrongful death from asbestos exposure.
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 90 (effective Sept. 1, 2005) requires physician reports proving asbestos-related functional pulmonary impairment (via pulmonary function testing) for nonmalignant asbestos claims, with a narrowly tailored “safety valve” (§90.010(f)(1)) for exceptional circumstances.
The Emmites initially attached reports by Drs. Kradin and Britton; Union Carbide moved to dismiss for noncompliance with Chapter 90 (lack of PFT-based impairment). The MDL court denied the motion orally, left the record open, and later considered additional reports including an amended report by Dr. Prince.
Dr. Prince relied on medical records and his treatment but acknowledged (and the record showed) the only PFTs were decades old and did not show impairment; he testified he did not rely on those PFTs to reach a diagnosis of impairment.
The court of appeals held the reports non‑compliant with §90.010(f)(1)(B)(ii) (requiring performed and interpreted PFTs relevant to diagnosis) but concluded the safety‑valve requirement was unconstitutionally retroactive as applied to the Emmites; the Texas Supreme Court granted review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were later reports and evidence admissible after the MDL court’s oral denial and pending motions?	Emmites: court’s oral ruling and subsequent events permitted further evidence and invocation of §90.010(f); timing rules for §90.003 don’t apply to §90.010(f).	Union Carbide: post-deadline reports were untimely; no motion for extension/good cause.	Held: MDL court did not abuse discretion — claimant timely invoked §90.010(f) while motions pending, allowing evidentiary development under §90.010(g).
Does §90.010(f)(1)(B)(ii) require pulmonary function testing that meaningfully contributes to the physician’s diagnosis of functional impairment?	Emmites: statute requires only that PFTs were performed and interpreted, not that they show impairment or were relied upon.	Union Carbide: PFTs must be relevant to or demonstrate impairment; mere existence of old/normal tests is insufficient.	Held: PFTs must be relevant to the physician’s diagnosis (e.g., show some impairment or otherwise inform the impairment conclusion); Dr. Prince’s report failed this requirement.
Did the failure to satisfy §90.010(f)(1)(B)(ii) mandate dismissal?	Emmites: safety valve satisfied by Dr. Prince and other evidence; MDL findings supported denial of dismissal.	Union Carbide: noncompliance requires mandatory dismissal under Chapter 90.	Held: Because Dr. Prince’s report did not comply with §90.010(f)(1)(B)(ii), dismissal was required; Court rendered judgment dismissing the suit.
Is §90.010(f)(1)(B)(ii) unconstitutionally retroactive as applied to the Emmites?	Emmites: applying the PFT requirement to their accrued claim is retroactive and violates Tex. Const. art. I, §16.	Union Carbide: Chapter 90 serves a compelling public interest and its retroactive effect here is permissible under Robinson’s three-factor test.	Held: Not unconstitutional as applied. Court found a compelling public interest and that the plaintiffs lacked settled expectations sufficient to overcome that interest.

Key Cases Cited

Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2010) (framework for analyzing unconstitutional retroactivity — three factors: public interest, nature of right, extent of impairment)
City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2008) (statutory construction: ascertain legislature’s intent from text)
Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002) (definition of retroactive law)
Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010) (presumption that legislature intended the words it used; avoid reading in requirements)
In re GlobalSantaFe Corp., 275 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2008) (discussion of Chapter 90’s purpose in conserving judicial/litigant resources)