2019 Ohio 183
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Unifund sued Lisa Piaser in municipal court in 2009 to collect an alleged Providian credit-card debt for which her last payment was July 5, 2000; Unifund purchased the account in 2004.
- Piaser counterclaimed individually and on behalf of classes under the FDCPA and Ohio CSPA, alleging Unifund filed time‑barred suits and sued without valid assignments.
- The trial court granted summary judgment on some claims in 2013, finding the former Ohio 15‑year statute for written contracts governed Unifund’s claim, and denied further discovery about the proposed Time‑Bar Class in 2014.
- In 2016 the court denied certification of the Time‑Bar Class (holding Piaser was not a class member) but certified an “Incompetence Class” limited to her FDCPA claim.
- On appeal this court held the trial court erred in applying Ohio’s 15‑year limitations period; Ohio’s borrowing statute (R.C. 2305.03(B)) requires application of New Hampshire’s 3‑year statute, so Piaser is potentially a member of the Time‑Bar Class.
- The matter was reversed in part and remanded for the trial court to apply the remaining Civ.R. 23 class‑certification factors; the court declined to reach Piaser’s discovery challenge as premature.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Piaser) | Defendant's Argument (Unifund) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which state statute of limitations governs Unifund’s 2009 Ohio suit? | Ohio’s 6‑year (oral) or New Hampshire’s 3‑year (per choice‑of‑law) applies, making the claim time‑barred. | Ohio’s former 15‑year written‑contract statute applies, so the suit was timely and Piaser is not in the Time‑Bar Class. | Borrowing statute applies; New Hampshire’s 3‑year limitations governs. |
| Was Piaser a member of the proposed Time‑Bar Class? | Yes, because New Hampshire’s 3‑year period expired before Unifund sued. | No, because Ohio’s 15‑year rule made the suit timely. | Trial court erred in finding she was not a member; remanded for full Civ.R. 23 analysis. |
| Was denial of additional discovery re: Time‑Bar Class reversible? | Trial court abused discretion by denying discovery needed for class certification. | Denial was proper; sufficient discovery had been produced. | Not ripe/final; court did not err for purposes of this appeal—Piaser may renew discovery if class is certified on remand. |
| Should appellate court address alternative grounds for denying class certification? | N/A (primary was membership issue). | Urged affirmance on commonality, typicality, and Civ.R. 23(B) bases. | Court declined to address alternate grounds not considered by trial court; remanded for trial court to analyze remaining Civ.R. 23 factors. |
Key Cases Cited
- Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co., Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 200 (1987) (trial court has broad discretion to certify class actions).
- Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 82 Ohio St.3d 67 (1998) (rigorous Civ.R. 23 analysis required; abuse‑of‑discretion standard applies).
- Baughman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ohio St.3d 480 (2000) (court’s articulated rationale permits appellate review of class certification).
- Medical Mutual of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 122 Ohio St.3d 181 (2009) (questions of law reviewed de novo when trial court misinterprets law).
- Taylor v. First Resolution Inv. Corp., 148 Ohio St.3d 627 (2016) (application of Ohio borrowing statute to credit‑card claims; accrual and retroactivity analysis).