467 P.3d 840
Utah2020Background
- In 2009 UDOT condemned a portion of land owned by Boggess-Draper Company for a 11400 South project in Draper; valuation date fixed at the date of service of summons (Dec. 17, 2009).
- Boggess sought compensation for the taken parcel and severance damages to the remaining parcel.
- The case was tried in 2018; in 2016 Boggess had sold and the remainder was developed into two car dealerships.
- Before trial the district court granted Boggess’s motion in limine excluding evidence of the 2016 sale/development as categorically irrelevant to 2009 valuation, citing statute and case law.
- The jury awarded Boggess about $1.7 million; Boggess sought attorney fees under the Utah Constitution, which the district court denied.
- UDOT appealed the exclusion of post-valuation evidence; Boggess cross-appealed the denial of fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a categorical rule bars post-valuation-date sales/development evidence in eminent domain valuation | UDOT: such post-date evidence can be relevant to what a willing buyer/seller would have expected and can test experts’ assumptions | Boggess: valuation is fixed at date of taking; later events are irrelevant under statute and precedent | Reversed categorical ban. Post-valuation transactions/development are potentially relevant; admissibility decided case-by-case under Rules 401/403 and valuation principles. |
| Whether Boggess opened the door at trial to admit post-valuation evidence | UDOT: Boggess’s counsel and experts made assertions (e.g., highest and best use degraded) that opened door | Boggess: trial conduct did not permit introduction of 2016 sale; district court correctly excluded it | Court declined to resolve in appellate opinion; remanded for new trial where district court will reassess admissibility and any "opened door" issues. |
| Whether attorney fees and litigation costs are part of constitutional "just compensation" | Boggess: just compensation should include fees/costs as transaction costs of forced sale; urged overruling of Ferrebee | UDOT: Ferrebee controls; just compensation covers property value, not litigation costs; alternative defense noted (stipulation) | Affirmed Ferrebee. No constitutional right to recover litigation costs/attorney fees as part of just compensation; legislative change required to provide such fees. |
Key Cases Cited
- Board of County Commissioners v. Ferrebee, 844 P.2d 308 (Utah 1992) (held just compensation does not include litigation costs; precedent affirmed)
- Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Ward, 347 P.2d 862 (Utah 1959) (sales remote in time may be relevant; remoteness affects weight not competency)
- Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974) (interpreted statute excluding post-summons improvements; does not establish a general bar to all post-valuation evidence)
- United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1979) (historic understanding: just compensation is for property, not litigation costs)
- Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (U.S. 1893) (litigation costs are indirect and not part of constitutional just compensation)
- Utah Dep’t of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1984) (admitted post-valuation evidence under statute allowing evidence of damages from proposed improvements)
- City of Hildale v. Cooke, 28 P.3d 697 (Utah 2001) (restates valuation-at-taking principle; does not create blanket exclusion of post-taking evidence)