Uchenna Helen Okafor v. Christopher Okafor, 14-21-00483-CV

Background

Christopher filed for divorce in Oct 2017; Uchenna counter-petitioned in May 2018. A prove-up hearing occurred on Sept 26, 2018 where the court stated parties agreed to a 50/50 division of U.S. property and that the court would not divide property in Nigeria and would add enforceable terms (including terms for sale of the Pecan Place house).
The trial court signed an Original Final Decree of Divorce on Dec 13, 2018 that (among other things) included: a 50/50 sale-and-split provision for 8802 Pecan Place Drive with detailed listing/sale duties; allocations of retirement accounts and cash; division of Nigerian property; and valuation/allocation of taxi medallions.
Christopher moved for reform/nunc pro tunc; a Reformed Decree was later declared void by the court. Christopher then sought judgment nunc pro tunc; the judge granted a nunc pro tunc judgment and on Aug 15, 2021 signed an Agreed Final Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc that (1) omitted any division provision for Nigerian property, (2) removed the Original Decree’s specific terms for selling the Pecan Place property, and (3) adjusted 50/50 property division language.
Uchenna appealed, arguing the Aug 15, 2021 nunc pro tunc decree was void for lack of jurisdiction because it made substantive changes after the court’s plenary power had expired.
The court of appeals reviewed whether the changes were clerical (correctable by nunc pro tunc) or judicial (not correctable after plenary power), and whether the Original Decree accurately reflected the court’s rendition at the prove-up.
Decision: the court affirmed the nunc pro tunc decree except it reversed and rendered as to the omission of the Original Decree’s Pecan Place sale terms, reinstating those sale conditions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Aug 15, 2021 nunc pro tunc decree was void because it made substantive changes to property division after plenary power expired	Okafor: Nunc pro tunc changed what was rendered (divided property the court lacked jurisdiction over and altered division), so it is void	Christopher: The nunc pro tunc corrected clerical errors to reflect the court’s rendition (exclude Nigeria; divide U.S. property 50/50)	Court rejected Okafor’s broad attack on the nunc pro tunc property-division language (overruled this contention)
Whether deletion of the Original Decree’s specific terms for sale of 8802 Pecan Place (listing, timing, duties) was a clerical correction or an improper substantive change	Okafor: Original Decree reflected the court’s rendition requiring sale under specified terms; removing those terms is a substantive change and void	Christopher: Characterized as a clerical correction to the written decree	Court sustained Okafor on this point: deletion was a substantive change, nunc pro tunc was improper as to those omissions; the Original Decree’s Pecan Property sale terms were reinstated

Key Cases Cited

Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1986) (distinguishes clerical errors from judicial errors; nunc pro tunc may correct only clerical mistakes)
In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d 451 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018) (nunc pro tunc cannot be used to correct judicial errors after plenary power; such attempts are void)
In re A.M.C., 491 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016) (presumption that same judge’s recollection supports clerical-error finding when same judge signs both orders)
Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1973) (an attempted nunc pro tunc to correct judicial error after plenary power is void)
Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. 1978) (nunc pro tunc may not materially alter substantive rights or change party entitled to property)
King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003) (after plenary power, relief from judgment ordinarily requires a bill of review)
PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 2012) (void judgments may be attacked directly or collaterally)
Andrews v. Koch, 702 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1986) (clerical error does not stem from judicial reasoning; must be distinguished from judicial errors)
State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. 1995) (appellate court may declare a judgment void)
In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2014) (trial court’s plenary power cannot be extended by agreement or waiver)