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551 S.W.3d 148
Tex.
2018
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Background

  • Grantors (the Bryans) executed a 1951 deed reserving “an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in and to the Oil Royalty, Gas Royalty and Royalty in other Minerals,” followed by language stating “the same being equal to one-sixteenth (1/16) of the production.”
  • No lease existed at the time; 1/8 royalty was the customary standard in 1951 and the parties understood the reservation in that context.
  • The dispute is whether the deed reserved a fixed royalty (a 1/16 interest in production) or a floating royalty (one-half of whatever royalty a future lease provides).
  • The majority of the Court (not included in this excerpt) holds the deed reserved a floating 1/2 of future royalties; Justice Boyd dissents, arguing the deed unambiguously reserves a fixed 1/16 of production.
  • Boyd’s dissent applies the holistic interpretive approach from Hysaw v. Dawkins: read all language together, give effect to the parenthetical/definitional clause, and avoid isolating the first clause to create a conflict.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument (Laborde) Defendant's Argument (Bryans/Heirs) Held (Boyd dissent view)
Whether the deed reserves a fixed royalty (1/16 of production) or a floating royalty (1/2 of whatever royalty a future lease provides) The deed’s first clause reads as a floating reservation (1/2 of future lease royalties) The second clause defines the reservation as equal to 1/16 of production, showing fixed intent Deed reserved a fixed 1/16 royalty; clauses read together show intent to reserve one-half of the then-standard 1/8 royalty

Key Cases Cited

  • Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016) (requirement to read the entire instrument holistically to ascertain intent)
  • Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1937) (interpretation concerned whether reservation was half of royalty rights or half of mineral interest)
  • Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (double-fraction language can be fixed or floating; other clauses may determine floating intent)
  • Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1957) (language conveying "one-eighth of all of the oil royalty" construed as conveying a fixed fraction of production)
  • Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980) (single-fraction royalty language can mean either a fixed royalty or a fraction of royalties)
  • Moore v. Noble Energy, Inc., 374 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012) (parenthetical parent clause construed as defining a fixed 1/16 interest rather than a floating royalty)
  • Helms v. Guthrie, 573 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1978) (similar deed language held to reserve a fixed 1/16 of production)
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Case Details

Case Name: U.S. Shale Energy II, LLC, Raymond B. Roush, Ruthie Roush Dodge, and David E. Roush v. Laborde Properties, L.P., and Laborde Management, Llc
Court Name: Texas Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 29, 2018
Citations: 551 S.W.3d 148; 17-0111
Docket Number: 17-0111
Court Abbreviation: Tex.
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    U.S. Shale Energy II, LLC, Raymond B. Roush, Ruthie Roush Dodge, and David E. Roush v. Laborde Properties, L.P., and Laborde Management, Llc, 551 S.W.3d 148