U.S. ex rel. Paul Dorsa v. Miraca Life Sciences, Inc., 33 F.4th 352

Paul Dorsa was hired as Miraca Life Sciences’ Senior VP of Commercial Operations and signed an employment agreement containing a binding arbitration clause.
Dorsa discovered and internally reported programs he believed violated the Anti‑Kickback Statute and Stark Law that produced thousands of allegedly false Medicare claims, and he filed a sealed qui tam complaint on September 20, 2013.
Four days after filing the qui tam and shortly after denying a purported harassment complaint, Miraca terminated Dorsa; he amended his complaint to add an FCA retaliation claim seeking back/front pay and fees.
Miraca moved to dismiss, arguing the arbitration clause covers any dispute “arising out of or in connection with” the employment agreement; the district court rejected that scope argument and denied dismissal.
Miraca initially appealed (appeal dismissed for lack of FAA §16 jurisdiction because the motion sought dismissal, not an order to compel arbitration), then moved to stay and compel arbitration; the district court denied that petition and found Miraca waived its delegation argument.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held Miraca waived and forfeited its key arbitration arguments and affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition to compel arbitration.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Dorsa)	Defendant's Argument (Miraca)	Held
1. Who decides threshold arbitrability (court or arbitrator)?	Court may decide because arbitration clause does not clearly delegate threshold questions.	Parties delegated threshold arbitrability to an arbitrator; district court lacks authority.	Waiver: Miraca waived this delegation defense by first asking the court to decide arbitrability and later reversing course; court may decide.
2. Does the arbitration clause cover the FCA retaliation claim (scope)?	Retaliation claim is independent of the employment agreement and falls outside clause limited to disputes "arising out of or in connection with" the Employment Agreement; equitable relief carve‑out allows court relief.	The clause broadly covers all employer–employee interactions, including the retaliation claim.	Forfeited on appeal: Miraca did not preserve or contest the district court’s scope ruling in its petition to compel; appellate review of the merits is barred by §16 jurisdictional limits, so the court declined to reach the scope question on the merits.

Johnson Assocs. Corp. v. HL Operating Corp., 680 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (describes waiver standard and two‑prong test for arbitration waiver).
In re Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig., 754 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding waiver where party first invoked court litigation machinery then sought arbitration).
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (federal policy favors arbitration and streamlined proceedings).
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) (arbitration’s objectives include expeditious resolution and streamlined proceedings).
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2008) (issues raised first in a reply are often waived).
Nassiri v. Mackie, 967 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2020) (appellate court reviews the case presented to the district court and disfavors new arguments on appeal).
Conrad v. Phone Directories Co., 585 F.3d 1376 (10th Cir. 2009) (appealability under FAA §16 limited to orders to stay or to compel arbitration).
E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Tex., 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1977) (substantial invocation of litigation machinery can constitute waiver/prejudice).
Kramer v. Hammond, 943 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1991) (prejudice may arise when a party loses on merits then attempts to relitigate via arbitration).