983 F.3d 885
6th Cir.2020Background
- Paul Dorsa, a former Miraca executive, filed a sealed qui tam FCA suit on Sept. 20, 2013; he was fired Sept. 24, 2013 and later added an FCA retaliation claim (31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)).
- The United States intervened in Nov. 2018; the qui tam claims were dismissed in May 2019, leaving Dorsa’s retaliation claim.
- Miraca moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1),(3),(6) and invoked the Federal Arbitration Act, arguing Dorsa’s employment agreement required mediation then binding arbitration of employment-related disputes.
- The district court denied Miraca’s motion, concluding the FCA retaliation claim did not “arise from, or have any connection with, an employment agreement,” and thus was not covered by the arbitration clause.
- Miraca appealed under 9 U.S.C. § 16; Dorsa moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction because Miraca never asked the district court to stay proceedings under § 3 or to compel arbitration under § 4 of the FAA, and dismissed the appeal.
- Judge Batchelder dissented, arguing Sixth Circuit precedent (Simon, Turi) permits interlocutory FAA appeals when a motion to dismiss is based on an arbitration clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dorsa) | Defendant's Argument (Miraca) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court’s denial of Miraca’s motion to dismiss is immediately appealable under FAA § 16 | No — Miraca never sought a stay under § 3 or an order compelling arbitration under § 4, so § 16 does not confer jurisdiction | Yes — the district court’s denial had the same practical effect as refusing a stay or denying a petition to compel arbitration, so § 16 permits immediate appeal | No appellate jurisdiction: § 16(a) authorizes appeals only from refusals to stay under § 3 or denials of petitions under § 4; Miraca did not seek either relief in district court, so appealability under § 16 fails |
| Whether the arbitration clause covers Dorsa’s FCA retaliation claim | The FCA retaliation claim is not derived from the employment agreement and thus is not arbitrable | The dispute resolution clause covers “any dispute, claim or disagreement arising out of or in connection with” employment, so the retaliation claim must be arbitrated | District court held the retaliation claim was not covered; the Sixth Circuit did not reach the merits because it dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction |
| Whether citing the FAA in a motion to dismiss is sufficient to invoke § 16 interlocutory appeal | Citing the FAA suffices if motion is based on arbitration clause | Mere references to the FAA are enough to make the denial appealable | Mere citation is insufficient; the movant must have sought the specific FAA remedies (stay under § 3 or order to compel under § 4) |
| Whether Sixth Circuit precedent (Simon, Turi) allows § 16 appeals where movant sought dismissal based on arbitration clause | Simon and Turi support jurisdiction even where movant requested dismissal rather than explicitly invoking § 3 or § 4 | Simon and Turi are distinguishable because in those cases the movants sought dismissal plus FAA relief (or the motions functioned as requests to compel) | Majority: those precedents require a request for FAA relief (stay or compel) in the district court record; dissent disagreed and would treat such dismissal motions as functional equivalents to motions to compel |
Key Cases Cited
- Simon v. Pfizer, Inc., 398 F.3d 765 (6th Cir. 2005) (discusses appellate jurisdiction under § 16 for refusals to enforce arbitration through dismissal or stay)
- Turi v. Main St. Adoption Servs., LLP, 633 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2011) (held a motion to dismiss based on arbitration clause was appealable under the FAA)
- ATAC Corp. v. Arthur Treacher’s, Inc., 280 F.3d 1091 (6th Cir. 2002) (statutes authorizing appeals are strictly construed)
- Conrad v. Phone Directories Co., 585 F.3d 1376 (10th Cir. 2009) (look beyond caption to whether district motion plainly sought FAA relief)
- Devon Robotics, LLC v. DeViedma, 798 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2015) (held jurisdiction not barred where motions raise both FAA and alternative relief; mere offhand FAA references insufficient)
- Van Dusen v. Swift Transp. Co., 830 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2016) (§ 16 review limited to orders specified by statute)
- Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (§ 16(a) appellate review limited to orders specified in plain text)
- Taylor v. Pilot Corp., 955 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2020) (affirms that § 16 jurisdiction includes district court refusals to enforce arbitration through dismissal or stay)