U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Bartram
140 So. 3d 1007
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- In 2005 Bartram borrowed $650,000 secured by a mortgage assigned to U.S. Bank; he defaulted in January 2006.
- Bank filed a foreclosure in May 2006 and expressly accelerated the entire debt; Bartram never disputed the default or acceleration in that action.
- The Bank’s 2006 foreclosure was involuntarily dismissed under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b) in May 2011; the Bank did not appeal.
- Patricia Bartram (ex-wife and junior lienholder) filed a separate foreclosure in 2011 and Bartram asserted a crossclaim seeking declaratory relief and quiet title against the Bank.
- Bartram moved for summary judgment arguing the Bank’s prior acceleration started the five‑year statute of limitations and thus barred any subsequent foreclosure; the trial court granted summary judgment, canceled the Bank’s note and mortgage, and released the lien.
- The district court reversed, holding Singleton governs: a subsequent default after a failed foreclosure creates a new cause of action, so the statute of limitations does not bar a later foreclosure based on defaults occurring after the dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an attempted acceleration in a dismissed foreclosure starts the five‑year statute of limitations for all future defaults | Bartram: acceleration in the first suit triggered accrual for the whole debt, so the statute ran and Bank is barred from later foreclosure | Bank: dismissal nullified the prior acceleration for statute‑of‑limitations purposes; only defaults occurring within five years of a new suit are actionable | Held: Singleton controls — a new default after a failed/dismissed action creates a new cause of action; statute begins to run for each new default, so Bank may sue on post‑dismissal defaults if within five years |
Key Cases Cited
- Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 2004) (res judicata does not necessarily bar successive foreclosures based on different default periods)
- Greene v. Bursey, 733 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (acceleration may cause statute of limitations to run on future installments)
- Reed v. Lincoln, 731 So.2d 104 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (absence of acceleration requires installment‑by‑installment limitations analysis)
- Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, 150 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (earlier, stricter view that acceleration in first suit bars subsequent suits; disapproved by Singleton)