Tyson v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1015

Tyson, an Australian-born former permanent resident, was convicted in 1980 in the United States for importing heroin under a stipulated facts trial that waived her right to a jury trial and admitted the importation of 64.5 grams of heroin.
District court found Tyson guilty on the importation count but not guilty on the distribution count, and imposed three years of probation.
At the time, the INA allowed § 212(c) discretionary relief for certain long-term residents, a provision repealed in 1996 for aliens with drug convictions and other offenses.
In 2005 Tyson sought re-entry and applied for § 212(c) relief, relying on St. Cyr; DHS denied relief and argued Tyson’s stipulation did not equate to a guilty plea.
The IJ and BIA held that St. Cyr could not extend to Tyson because she did not plead guilty but proceeded to trial, despite the stipulation’s similarity to a guilty plea.
The Ninth Circuit held that the stipulation trial is substantially equivalent to a guilty plea for § 212(c) purposes, and that retroactive repeal would be impermissible; case remanded to consider merits of § 212(c) application.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does St. Cyr apply to a stipulated facts trial?	Tyson relied on St. Cyr for relief despite no guilty plea.	St. Cyr limits relief to pleas, not stipulated trials.	Yes; stipulated facts trial qualifies for St. Cyr relief analysis.
Is Tyson's reliance on discretionary relief reasonable given the stipulated facts trial?	Reliance was objectively reasonable based on expectations before 1996 repeal.	No clear reliance due to trial posture and lack of written plea.	Reliance was objectively reasonable; retroactivity analysis favors Tyson.
Does retroactive repeal of § 212(c) impose an impermissible disability on Tyson?	Applying repeal retroactively would impair vested rights and settled expectations.	Legislation retroactivity is permissible where properly justified.	Retroactive repeal is impermissible for Tyson; remand for merits.
Did the government obtain a tangible benefit from Tyson's stipulation trial?	The government benefited by guaranteed conviction and avoiding full trial.	No quid pro quo required for retroactivity ruling.	Tangible government benefits were present; supports reliance analysis.
Should the BIA be instructed to consider Tyson's § 212(c) eligibility on the merits?	Case should be remanded to evaluate merits under the proper retroactivity framework.	BIA reasonably concluded ineligibility under retroactive constraints.	Remand to consider merits of § 212(c) relief.

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (U.S. Supreme Court 2001) (retroactivity of repeal to reliance on § 212(c) plea-based relief)
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (U.S. Supreme Court 1994) (test for determining retroactive application of statutes)
Camins v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2007) (retroactivity and reliance under St. Cyr doctrine)
Hernandez de Anderson v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (reliance on eligibility for relief and retroactivity considerations)
Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2004) (oral plea agreements and retroactivity risks in relief eligibility)
Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognition of reliance related to immigration consequences)
Saravia-Paguada v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2007) (reliance considerations in § 212(c) context)
Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) (modulated scope of § 212(c) relief in retroactivity discussions)
Chang v. United States, 327 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2003) (reasonableness of reliance in legal change contexts)
Lopez-Castellanos v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2006) (Landgraf framework and settled expectations in immigration law)