Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo
136 S. Ct. 1036
| SCOTUS | 2016Background
- Tyson Foods employees at a pork plant (kill, cut, retrim) alleged they were not paid overtime for donning and doffing protective gear because Tyson paid under a "gang-time" system and did not record individual don/doff minutes.
- Tyson sometimes paid a uniform 4-minute "K-code" allowance historically, later varying payments and then none for many employees; no contemporaneous records of actual donning/doffing time existed.
- Plaintiffs (respondents) sued under the FLSA and Iowa wage law, sought class certification (Rule 23 for state claims; §216 collective action for FLSA claims). The District Court certified large classes (Rule 23 class ≈3,344 members).
- Plaintiffs relied on representative statistical evidence: Dr. Mericle videotaped donning/doffing and estimated averages (≈18 min/day for cut/retrim; 21.25 min/day for kill). Dr. Fox applied those averages to payroll data to estimate which employees crossed the 40-hour overtime threshold.
- A jury found donning/doffing at shift start/end compensable, awarded ~$2.9M (about half plaintiffs’ expert aggregate figure). Tyson argued certification and the use of representative evidence were improper; Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) was proper given individual variation in donning/doffing time | Mericle’s representative sample could establish hours worked for each class member and thereby satisfy predominance | Variation among individuals in gear and time predominates and prevents classwide proof; representative evidence would avoid individualized proof and prejudice Tyson | Affirmed: representative sample permissible where it would have sufficed in individual actions and fills evidentiary gap created by employer’s failure to keep records (Anderson/Mt. Clemens principle) |
| Whether use of representative/statistical evidence in a class action is categorically impermissible | No categorical bar; admissibility and sufficiency depend on the evidence’s purpose and the cause of action | Court should adopt a broad rule excluding representative evidence in class cases to protect defendants and individual defenses | Rejected categorical exclusion; admissibility governed by ordinary evidentiary rules and whether the sample could have supported individual suits |
| Whether the jury verdict can be distributed without awarding damages to uninjured class members | Plaintiffs proposed methods (e.g., applying an inferred average time) to identify injured members; bifurcation had been proposed to avoid this problem | Because the jury awarded a lump sum smaller than plaintiffs’ expert aggregate, it’s unclear who is injured; decertification or reversal is required if uninjured members would recover | Court declined to decide now: issue is premature — allocation methods and challenges should be addressed on remand by the District Court |
| Interaction of Mt. Clemens burden-shifting with class-admissibility of representative evidence | Mt. Clemens permits reasonable inference of hours when employer failed to keep records; representative evidence thus can satisfy individual burdens | Mt. Clemens cannot be read to authorize using inadequate representative evidence to prove individualized elements across a class | Court held Mt. Clemens supports permitting representative evidence here, but emphasized admissibility and reliability remain governed by evidentiary rules; employer can rebut or discredit the sample |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) (when employer fails to keep required records, employees may prove hours by reasonable inference and shift burden to employer)
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (class certification fails where no common proof of employer-wide policy; cautions against weak representative proof)
- Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011) (assessing when classwide proof is probative requires attention to elements of the cause of action)
- Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (predominance requires careful scrutiny of relation between common and individual issues)
- Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013) (predominance defeated where individualized damage methodology overwhelms common issues)
- Hoffmann‑La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989) (scope of collective/representative actions; remedial goals can inform class/collective procedures)
- IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (time spent walking after donning protective gear may be compensable under FLSA)