Tyrrell v. Frakes
309 Neb. 85
| Neb. | 2021Background
- Gregory Tyrrell was paroled subject to special conditions (no online social media; monthly programming fee) and signed to accept sex-offender parole conditions.
- A report and Tyrrell’s admission that he used online dating led the Board of Parole to allege a social-media violation; the Board also found he failed to pay fees and revoked his parole (order entered Dec. 4, 2018).
- More than five months later Tyrrell filed in district court: initially a declaratory-judgment action, then an amended pleading styled as a combined petition in error and an application for a writ of habeas corpus naming Department officials.
- The district court quashed the habeas application (Jan. 13, 2020), concluding parole revocations are not within Nebraska habeas relief, and later dismissed the petition in error as untimely (May 29, 2020).
- Tyrrell appealed after the dismissal; the State argued the appeal as to the habeas ruling was untimely, while Tyrrell relied on § 25-1315(1) (finality rules for multi-claim actions) to show timeliness. The Nebraska Supreme Court granted bypass and addressed timeliness and whether habeas was an appropriate remedy to challenge a parole condition not raised at revocation or on timely appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Tyrrell’s Argument | Frakes/Cotton’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the appeal of the habeas ruling timely? | The joined petition in error delayed appealability under § 25-1315(1); appeal filed within 30 days after final disposition of all claims. | The habeas denial (Jan. 2020) was a final order and required appeal within 30 days. | Appeal was timely: when habeas and a petition in error are joined, § 25-1315(1) postpones appealability until disposition of the error proceeding. |
| Did the district court have jurisdiction of the petition in error? | Argued he could challenge parole revocation via petition in error. | Board/defendants argued the petition in error was untimely. | District court correctly dismissed the petition in error for lack of jurisdiction; Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over those assignments. |
| Is habeas corpus available to challenge the constitutionality of a parole condition after failing to raise it at revocation or in a timely error proceeding? | Packingham and First Amendment principles render the social-media condition unconstitutional and justify habeas relief despite no prior challenge. | Habeas is a collateral attack available only to void judgments/sentences; it cannot substitute for an appeal or error proceeding to challenge a parole condition. | Habeas is not a proper remedy here; it cannot be used to attack a parole condition’s constitutionality after the parolee failed to raise it at revocation or on timely appeal. |
| Can habeas be used as a substitute for appeal when attacking detention arising from a final conviction/sentence? | Argued broader habeas scope applies (cited federal authority). | Nebraska law restricts habeas for prisoners to attacks showing judgment/sentence/commitment are void; mere errors are not enough. | Held that Nebraska habeas is limited; it cannot substitute for appeal or error proceedings and will not lie for merely voidable errors. |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Houston, 274 Neb. 916, 744 N.W.2d 410 (Neb. 2008) (an order denying habeas relief may qualify as a final order; test of finality depends on whether the particular proceeding is terminated)
- TDP Phase One v. The Club at the Yard, 307 Neb. 795, 950 N.W.2d 640 (Neb. 2020) (when a special statutory claim is part of a multi-claim action, § 25-1315 governs immediate appealability)
- Rafert v. Meyer, 298 Neb. 461, 905 N.W.2d 30 (Neb. 2018) (final-order requirements for appealability in civil actions)
- Sanders v. Frakes, 295 Neb. 374, 888 N.W.2d 514 (Neb. 2016) (Nebraska habeas is not proper to challenge validity of statute underlying a final conviction/sentence)
- Piercy v. Parratt, 202 Neb. 102, 273 N.W.2d 689 (Neb. 1978) (to obtain habeas relief releasing a person from sentence, the sentence must be void)
- Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (U.S. 2017) (U.S. Supreme Court held a statewide statute broadly restricting sex-offenders’ access to social-media sites implicated First Amendment rights; cited by Tyrrell but not determinative for parole-condition challenges)