Tyrone William Holland v. Governor of Georgia, 669 F. App'x 541

Plaintiff Tyrone William Holland, pro se, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Georgia’s sex-offender registration statute was unlawfully applied to him.
The district court dismissed Holland’s complaint as time-barred based on a magistrate judge’s recommendation; Holland appealed.
Georgia’s sex-offender registration provisions became applicable to Holland on July 1, 1996, shortly after his incarceration.
The applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Georgia is two years (O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33); accrual is governed by federal law.
The record lacks any evidence that Holland received actual notice he would be required to register upon release or otherwise knew of the claim more than two years before filing.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded the district court erred in dismissing the complaint and reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Holland's § 1983 claim is time-barred	Holland contends his suit was timely because he lacked notice that the registry applied to him, so the limitations period never began	The state/district court treated accrual as having occurred earlier, rendering the suit untimely	Reversed: accrual requires actual or constructive notice; record lacks facts showing Holland knew or should have known more than two years before filing

McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.) (§ 1983 claims borrow state personal-injury limitations period)
Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556 (11th Cir.) (limitations accrual: claim begins when facts are or should be apparent)
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (U.S.) (accrual date for § 1983 is question of federal law)
Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir.) (statute begins when prisoner receives notice making facts apparent)
Brown v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir.) (limitations began when parole decision put prisoner on notice of rights being affected)
Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107 (11th Cir.) (pleading review standard when reviewing dismissals under § 1915A)