Tyree Marquez Trader v. the State of Texas, 03-19-00591-CR

Trader was indicted for aggravated sexual assault of 14-year-old T.D.; jury acquitted on aggravated charge but convicted of the lesser included sexual assault and sentenced to 10 years.
T.D. testified she was forced at gunpoint into a car, taken to a secluded concrete enclosure, forced to perform oral sex, and had intercourse; vaginal swab later contained a DNA mixture consistent with Trader being a contributor.
The State offered testimony and DNA evidence from T.D., first responders, a SANE, a detective, and a DNA expert.
The State also introduced extraneous-offense evidence (two prior alleged sexual assaults involving Reed and U.T.); Trader objected under Tex. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403 and sought to impeach T.D. via testimony from Brian Cox about inconsistent prior statements.
On appeal Trader argued (1) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding certain impeachment questions to Cox, and (2) the court erred by admitting the extraneous-offense evidence; the appellate court affirmed.

Issue	State's Argument	Trader's Argument	Held
Whether exclusion of Cox’s testimony (about T.D. being a runaway, discussing a party, attending a party, or voluntariness of drug use) was reversible abuse of discretion	Questions were objectionable as irrelevant/hearsay/improper impeachment/lack of personal knowledge	Exclusion prevented impeachment by contradiction of T.D.’s trial testimony and improperly limited cross-examination	No reversible abuse: substantially the same contradictory evidence was before the jury or exclusion fell within the court’s reasonable discretion
Whether admission of two extraneous sexual-assaults was improper under Rules 404(b) and 403	Evidence was admissible to rebut Trader’s contested consent defense, showing a sufficiently distinctive modus operandi and high probative value; limiting instruction minimized prejudice	Evidence was improper character/propensity evidence, insufficiently similar, and unduly prejudicial under Rule 403	No abuse: admitted to rebut hotly disputed consent issue as modus-operandi evidence and survived Rule 403 balancing given probative value and limiting instruction

Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (standards for abuse-of-discretion review on admission/exclusion of evidence)
Michael v. State, 235 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (taxonomy of impeachment methods: specific vs. nonspecific)
Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (permitting extrinsic evidence to impeach by contradiction)
De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (extraneous-offense evidence admissible to rebut defensive theory that negates an element)
Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (admissibility of extraneous offenses when consent is hotly disputed)
Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (modus operandi test for similarity of extraneous acts)
Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (definition of probative value in Rule 403 balancing)
Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (factors for Rule 403 balancing)
Womble v. State, 618 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (no reversal where excluded evidence is later admitted elsewhere)