Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso
305 Ga. 480
Ga.2019Background
- In 2014 Maria and Mario Matta sued Michael and Lakeisha Thornton after the Thorntons' two pit bulls escaped and severely injured Maria while she was walking nearby; the dogs were shot by police.
- The Mattas later added the Thorntons' landlord, Gregory Tyner, alleging liability under OCGA § 44-7-14 for failing to repair a broken front-gate latch that allegedly permitted the dogs to escape.
- Tyner moved for summary judgment; the trial court found he breached his duty to keep premises in repair but granted summary judgment because plaintiffs produced no evidence Tyner knew the dogs had vicious propensities.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning it could apply OCGA § 51-2-7 (dangerous-animal statute) because the dogs allegedly violated a local leash ordinance and that § 44-7-14 could reach injuries off the leased premises.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari, held § 51-2-7 does not apply to out-of-possession landlords, and reversed the Court of Appeals, concluding plaintiffs failed to show a genuine issue that Tyner had knowledge making the attack reasonably foreseeable (proximate cause).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of OCGA § 51-2-7 to an out-of-possession landlord | § 51-2-7 supports presumption of vicious propensity because dogs were allegedly running at large in violation of local ordinance | § 51-2-7 applies only to a person who "owns or keeps" the animal; Tyner did not | § 51-2-7 does not apply to Tyner (out-of-possession landlord); Court of Appeals erred to apply it |
| Whether § 44-7-14 imposes landlord liability here (duty and breach) | Tyner knew of the broken latch and failed to repair it; statute requires only proof Tyner knew of defect and that injuries arose from the breach | Tyner concedes duty/breach for summary judgment purposes but argues lack of proximate cause and that tenants had superior knowledge of dogs | Court assumed duty and breach but required proximate causation (foreseeability) to impose liability |
| Foreseeability/proximate cause: must landlord know dogs' vicious propensities? | Statute contains no express knowledge element; plaintiffs need only show landlord knew of defect and injury arose from it | Reasonable foreseeability requires evidence landlord had superior knowledge of dangerous propensity; mere knowledge that dogs existed is insufficient | Held that plaintiffs must present evidence landlord knew of dogs' dangerous tendencies; absent such evidence, no genuine issue of proximate cause exists |
| Summary judgment standard (jury question?) | Proximate cause usually for jury; summary judgment improper | Where evidence is plain and undisputable, court decides foreseeability as matter of law | Court held lack of evidence on foreseeability made summary judgment appropriate for Tyner |
Key Cases Cited
- Steagald v. Eason, 300 Ga. 717 (2017) (courts assume dogs are presumptively harmless; proof of dangerousness and owner's knowledge required)
- Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B., 300 Ga. 840 (2017) (elements of negligence and when foreseeability is for the court)
- Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120 (1999) (out-of-possession landlord liability limited; any expansion must come from legislature)
- Colquitt v. Rowland, 265 Ga. 905 (1995) (landlord not liable for dangerous condition erected by tenant after relinquishing possession)
- Pickard v. Cook, 223 Ga. App. 595 (1996) (in dog-bite/premises cases, prior vicious propensity and knowledge are critical to impose liability)