Tye v. Beausay, 2020 Ohio 3746

Scott and Barbara Tye retained attorney T. Jeffrey Beausay (of the Donahey Law Firm) in a 2010 medical-malpractice suit; Beausay named their adult sons Matthew and Joshua as plaintiffs without the sons' knowledge.
The case settled; Matthew and Joshua signed releases at their father’s request and received no segregated funds; Scott died shortly after the dismissals.
Plaintiffs sued Beausay and the Donahey Law Firm for legal malpractice (and alternative theories); this Court in Tye I found a possible "malice" substitute for attorney-client relationship and remanded.
On remand, defendants moved for summary judgment arguing (inter alia) lack of proximate cause and that Beausay was an independent contractor (so the firm is not vicariously liable).
In supplemental depositions Matthew admitted he would have signed the release even if fully informed; Joshua is developmentally disabled and his guardian Jodi‑Anne Phares testified she could not say what she would have done if informed.
Trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on proximate cause and respondeat superior; this Court affirms as to Matthew and the firm, reverses as to Joshua against Beausay, and remands for Joshua’s claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proximate cause — Matthew (malpractice)	Matthew would have been harmed because Beausay used his name and obtained releases without notice; harm presumed from exclusion from settlement value	Matthew admitted he would have signed the release even if informed, so defendants' conduct was not the but‑for cause of any loss	Affirmed for defendants — Matthew’s own admission defeats causation; SJ proper
Proximate cause — Joshua (malpractice via guardian Phares)	Joshua lost a viable claim when release was obtained without notice; guardian would likely have acted to protect him	Guardian could not state in deposition that she would have refused to sign or sought counsel; plaintiffs bear burden to show but‑for causation	Reversed as to Joshua vs Beausay — genuine issue of material fact exists about what guardian would have done; remanded
Respondeat superior — Donahey Law Firm liability	Firm represented Scott; Beausay used firm letterhead and signature blocks, creating at least apparent/continuing authority	Beausay was an independent contractor; firm lacked control over means and no evidence firm created apparent authority; plaintiff failed to rebut with evidence	Affirmed for firm — no genuine issue of material fact on vicarious liability; no evidence of control or apparent authority

Tye v. Beausay, 98 N.E.3d 970 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (prior panel decision recognizing a possible "malice" substitute for attorney-client relationship and that harm could be disputed)
Vahila v. Hall, 674 N.E.2d 1164 (Ohio 1997) (elements and proximate-cause approach for legal-malpractice negligence)
Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 1985) (informed-consent causation: reasonable-person standard and limits of hindsight testimony)
White v. Leimbach, 959 N.E.2d 1033 (Ohio 2011) (clarifying that reasonable-person causation in informed-consent context is for the factfinder)
Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wuerth, 913 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio 2009) (law‑firm vicarious liability principles; firm liable only for principals/employees acting in ordinary course or with actual/apparent authority)
Jeffers v. Olexo, 539 N.E.2d 614 (Ohio 1989) (discussion of proximate cause and foreseeability in tort law)