997 F.3d 288
5th Cir.2021Background
- HB 1888 (2019) requires counties’ "temporary branch" early‑voting sites to be open at least 8 hours/day on the same days as the county’s main "permanent branch," effectively banning mobile/pop‑up voting sites.
- Before HB 1888, multiple Texas counties ran pop‑up early‑voting sites at college campuses and senior living facilities; counties curtailed those sites after the law.
- Plaintiffs (Texas Democratic Party, DSCC, DCCC, Texas Young Democrats, Texas College Democrats, student Emily Gilby, and voter Terrell Blodgett) sued the Texas Secretary of State seeking declaratory and injunctive relief alleging First Amendment, Equal Protection, Twenty‑Sixth Amendment, and ADA violations; the ADA claim was dismissed by the district court.
- The Secretary moved to dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity bars the suit; the district court denied sovereign immunity, and the Secretary appealed that denial.
- The Texas Election Code vests administration and establishment of early‑voting locations in local officials (early voting clerks and county governing bodies), and the Secretary issued an advisory describing HB 1888 as banning mobile/pop‑up sites.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of Ex parte Young to the Texas Secretary of State | The Secretary enforces HB 1888 and can be enjoined under Ex parte Young | The Secretary lacks a sufficient enforcement connection; local officials administer and enforce early‑voting rules | Secretary lacks the requisite enforcement connection; Ex parte Young does not authorize suit against her (reversal of district court denial of sovereign immunity) |
| Whether the Secretary is a proper target for prospective injunctive relief | Injunctive relief against the Secretary is appropriate to block enforcement of HB 1888 | Relief against the Secretary is improper because she does not enforce the statute; plaintiffs should sue local officials | Court did not reach the Secretary’s separate argument about improper relief after resolving lack of connection |
| Appealability of denial of sovereign immunity | Denial is an appealable collateral order | — | Appellate jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral‑order doctrine; review is de novo |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (establishes equitable exception to state sovereign immunity for prospective injunctive relief)
- Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 977 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2020) (held the Texas Secretary lacked a sufficient enforcement connection to early‑voting statutes)
- Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 851 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2017) (describes the "some connection" requirement for Ex parte Young)
- City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 2019) (reviews Ex parte Young doctrines and standard of review)
- Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2020) (observes that the circuit’s "connection" requirement remains imprecise)
- P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (applies collateral‑order doctrine to interlocutory appeals)
- Brownback v. King, 141 S. Ct. 740 (2021) (district courts retain authority to determine their own jurisdiction)