Two Shields v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 762

Background

Plaintiffs Ramona Two Shields and Mary Louise Defender Wilson (members of Fort Berthold/Standing Rock tribes) allege BIA breached fiduciary duties by approving below‑market oil and gas leases (2007–2008), approving 18% royalties, and allowing reassignment (“flipping”) without allottee consent, causing substantial damages.
The leases at issue were approved before the Cobell Settlement record date (Sept. 30, 2009); reassignments and later high‑value leases (e.g., to Williams) occurred after that date.
The Cobell class action (filed 1996) settled in 2010–2011; its Trust Administration Class included individuals with demonstrable ownership interests in trust land and released broad "land administration claims" (including failures to obtain fair market value) for class members who did not opt out.
Plaintiffs did not opt out of the Cobell Trust Administration Class; defendant contends the Cobell release therefore bars plaintiffs’ Count I fiduciary‑breach claims and entitles the government to summary judgment.
Plaintiffs also asserted Count II (failure to disclose that Cobell would subsume these claims) and Count III (Claims Resolution Act/Settlement amounted to an unconstitutional taking); government moved to dismiss Counts II–III for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim.
The Court granted the government summary judgment on Count I (Cobell release applies), denied discovery as futile, dismissed Count II for lack of Tucker Act jurisdiction (no statutory source for disclosure duty), and dismissed Count III for failure to state a cognizable takings claim.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Cobell Settlement releases plaintiffs’ fiduciary land‑management claims (Count I)	Two Shields: their claims "could not have been asserted" by the record date because damages weren’t fully known until later; deny membership/coverage without discovery	U.S.: plaintiffs were Trust Administration Class members who failed to opt out; "land administration claims" expressly include the kinds of leasing claims here	Court: plaintiffs were class members, their claims were "land administration claims" that could have been asserted by record date; grant summary judgment for defendant
Whether plaintiffs are entitled to discovery before resolution of Cobell‑release issue	Plaintiffs sought discovery to dispute class membership, notice, settlement scope	U.S.: release language is unambiguous; discovery would be futile	Court: denied discovery — release unambiguous and discovery would not create a material factual dispute
Whether court has Tucker Act jurisdiction over Count II (alleged duty to disclose that Cobell would subsume these claims)	Plaintiffs: government had fiduciary duty to disclose; failure to disclose is separate breach	U.S.: no specific statutory or regulatory source creates a disclosure duty; claim fails Navajo II threshold	Court: dismissed Count II for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction — plaintiffs failed to identify a money‑mandating statute creating a disclosure duty
Whether Claims Resolution Act/Settlement effected an unconstitutional taking (Count III)	Plaintiffs: retroactive authorization and settlement extinguished vested causes of action without just compensation	U.S.: plaintiffs received settlement remedies via Cobell and lack a vested, compensable property interest in unadjudicated causes of action	Court: dismissed Count III — plaintiffs’ causes of action are not a cognizable vested Fifth Amendment property interest and procedural due‑process complaints are not a takings claim

Key Cases Cited

Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (affirming Cobell settlement approval and class certification)
Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (district court findings of trust mismanagement in Cobell litigation)
United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009) (Tucker Act jurisdiction requires specific statutory/regulatory source creating fiduciary duties)
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976) (Tucker Act does not create substantive causes of action; a separate money‑mandating source is required)
Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (plaintiff must identify substantive source of law creating right to money damages)
Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. v. United States, 531 F.2d 1037 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (release bars claims based on events occurring prior to release absent special circumstances)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard for stating plausible claim)