Two Islands Development Corp. v. Clarke
239 So. 3d 115
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2018Background
- Dispute concerns development of a 160-unit condominium project (Príve at Island Estates) on the North Island in Aventura; plaintiffs include the North Island owner/trust (Cohen as trustee), developer entities, and seller; defendants are homeowners on the South Island (Island Estates) and Williams Island (WIPOA owners).
- Parties executed an Easement, Operating and Development Agreement (EODA) in 2013 among Two Islands Development, IEHOA, and Cohen as Trustee; EODA contained covenants, ratified easements, and a “covenants running with the land” clause but expressly excluded individual South Island lots from new easement areas.
- Plaintiffs allege defendants breached covenants, interfered with development and settlement, and made slanderous statements, causing construction delays, lost sales, and reputational harm; amended complaint pleaded five counts (breach of covenant, specific performance, breach of good faith, slander of title against four individuals, and tortious interference with a settlement against Feder and Williams Island defendants).
- At a December 4, 2015 hearing, the trial court orally dismissed all counts with prejudice, finding defendants were not parties to the EODA and that litigation/anti‑SLAPP privileges applied; before the written order, plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal without prejudice as to the Williams Island defendants.
- The trial court’s January 13, 2016 written order dismissed the entire case with prejudice as to all defendants; appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court could dismiss Williams Island defendants after plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed them before written order | Plaintiffs: their Rule 1.420 notice voluntarily dropped Williams Island defendants before the written order, so court lacked authority to dismiss them with prejudice | Defendants: court’s oral ruling dismissed all defendants and subsequent written order reflected that disposition | Reversed as to Williams Island defendants — voluntary dismissal was effective before entry of written order, so the dismissal-with-prejudice as to those defendants was void (dismissal without prejudice in effect) |
| Whether individual South Island homeowners are bound by the EODA or covenants running with the land (Counts I–III) | Plaintiffs: EODA created covenants/easements running with the land binding parcel owners and supports breach, specific performance, and good-faith claims | Defendants: EODA parties were the associations and Cohen/Trust; individual lots were expressly excluded from new easement areas, so individual homeowners are not signatories and no interest was created in their lots | Affirmed dismissal of Counts I–III as to South Island defendants — homeowners not parties/signatories and EODA did not create an interest in excluded individual lots, so no covenant running with the land binds them |
| Whether tortious‑interference claim against Feder is barred by the litigation privilege (Count V) | Plaintiffs: Feder’s communications induced Williams Island association to breach a settlement and are actionable interference | Defendants: Feder’s communications occurred in the course of judicial or related proceedings and are protected by Florida’s litigation privilege/anti‑SLAPP | Affirmed dismissal of Count V as to Feder — communications were protected communicative acts during judicial proceedings and thus absolutely privileged |
| Whether slander of title claim against four South Island individuals (Count IV) is barred by litigation privilege or otherwise deficient | Plaintiffs: the four individuals made false/malicious statements to prospective buyers disparaging Cohen’s title/right to build, causing lost sales — claim is actionable and not purely litigation conduct | Defendants: argue privilege and lack of pleadings showing unprivileged, malicious publication causing special damages | Reversed dismissal of Count IV as to Feder, Sawicki, Kleiman, and Coba — complaint adequately alleged slander of title (false malicious statements published to third parties causing special damages), so dismissal at this stage was error |
Key Cases Cited
- Schilling v. Herrera, 952 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (standard of review for dismissal and accepting well‑pleaded allegations)
- Freeman v. Mintz, 523 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (voluntary dismissal effective even after oral ruling but before written order)
- Gonzalez v. Mulreany, 375 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (effect of voluntary dismissal and trial court authority)
- Levin v. Middlebrooks, 639 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1994) (Florida’s litigation privilege affords absolute immunity for acts related to litigation)
- Echevarria v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2007) (litigation privilege applies broadly to acts occurring during judicial proceedings)