Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh
598 U.S. 471
SCOTUS2023Background
- 2017 Reina nightclub terrorist attack in Istanbul by an ISIS operative killed 39; U.S. nationals (Alassaf family) sued under the Antiterrorism Act (18 U.S.C. §2333) alleging secondary liability under JASTA (§2333(d)(2)).
- Plaintiffs sued Facebook, Twitter, and Google (YouTube), alleging the platforms knowingly allowed ISIS content, used recommendation algorithms that amplified that content, and profited from associated advertising (and that Google shared ad revenue with some ISIS videos).
- District Court dismissed for failure to state a claim; Ninth Circuit reversed, finding plausible aiding-and-abetting liability; Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- JASTA (2016) added secondary civil liability for anyone who “aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance,” and pointed to Halberstam v. Welch as the proper legal framework.
- The Supreme Court applied the common-law/Halberstam framework: aiding-and-abetting requires conscious, voluntary, culpable participation—i.e., knowing and substantial assistance tied to the actionable tort.
- Holding: plaintiffs’ allegations (provision of neutral platforms, algorithmic matching, failures to remove content, and sparse revenue-sharing claims) were too attenuated and passive to plausibly allege knowing, substantial assistance for the Reina attack; Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of “aids and abets” under §2333(d)(2) | Aider can be liable for aiding an enterprise (ISIS) generally; no strict act-specific nexus required | Liability requires aiding the specific act of international terrorism | Applied Halberstam: must show conscious, culpable participation in the tort; defendant must have aided the act (though exact nexus needn’t be hyper-technical) |
| Whether providing platforms/algorithms equals “knowingly providing substantial assistance” | Algorithms actively amplified ISIS content and platforms profited, so assistance was substantial and knowing | Platforms are neutral infrastructure; algorithmic sorting is content-agnostic and passive; no special treatment or intent to assist | Mere provision of neutral platforms and algorithmic matching, plus failure-to-remove allegations, are insufficient to plead knowing, substantial assistance |
| Nexus between defendants’ conduct and the Reina attack | ISIS’s online activity facilitated recruitment/funding that enabled attacks, so platforms materially assisted | Complaint lacks allegations that platforms were used to plan/coordinate the Reina attack or that defendants intended to facilitate that attack | Nexus too attenuated; plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege defendants culpably participated in the Reina attack |
| Google revenue-sharing allegation | Google reviewed/approved ISIS videos for monetization and shared ad revenue—constitutes substantial assistance | Complaint contains no specific facts on amounts, scope, or frequency of revenue-sharing | Allegations conclusory and factually thin; insufficient to show substantial assistance |
Key Cases Cited
- Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729 (2013) (common-law terms carry their traditional meaning)
- Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (articulating the three-element aiding-and-abetting framework and six factors for substantial assistance)
- Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) (aider must help another complete the crime; culpable participation required)
- Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949) (aiding requires intentional participation to make the venture succeed)
- Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (common-law concept of aider-and-abettor informs civil liability analyses)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (co-conspirator liability for reasonably foreseeable acts undertaken to further a conspiracy)
- Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (service providers not generally liable for users’ misuse of communication services)
- United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938) (early articulation of the mental-state requirement for accomplice liability)