Twigg v. State
100 A.3d 1187
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2014Background
- Twigg was convicted in Charles County Circuit Court of sexual child abuse, carnal knowledge, second degree rape, second degree sexual offense, third degree sexual offense, and incest, all tied to conduct with his minor daughter between 1974 and 1979.
- The circuit court sentenced him on October 17, 2011 to consecutive terms totaling 40 years, plus a 15-year suspended sentence for sexual child abuse and 5 years of probation.
- On appeal, Twigg challenged the imposition of separate sentences for second degree rape, third degree sexual offense, and incest.
- The Court of Special Appeals vacated all sentences except the sexual child abuse conviction and remanded for resentencing, holding merger of the other offenses into sexual child abuse for sentencing purposes.
- The court held that merger could be overridden only by legislative intent, and ultimately remanded for a new sentence on the sexual child abuse conviction within the statutory maximum for offenses committed between 1974 and 1979.
- The decision noted the 1990 amendment to the child abuse statute as prospective only and concluded Twigg’s pre-1990 conduct was subject to merger under Nightingale and White.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do the offenses merge for sentencing under Blockburger and Nightingale/White? | Twigg argues merger; separate sentences violate double jeopardy. | State argues legislative intent allows multiple punishments. | Yes; offenses merge; remanded for new sentence. |
| Does the 1990 amendment to art. 27, § 35A override the merger applicable to Twigg’s conduct? | Lt argues amendment does not retroactively apply to pre-1990 conduct. | State argues amendment shows legislative intent to allow separate sentences. | Amendment prospective only; merger governs for pre-1990 conduct. |
| May the court remand for a new sentence on the sexual child abuse conviction and what limits apply? | Remand is proper; new sentence within statutory maximum for 1974–1979 abuse. | Remand not necessary or limitlessly broad. | Court has discretion to remand and impose up to 15 years on sexual child abuse. |
Key Cases Cited
- Nightingale v. State, 312 Md. 699 (Md. 1988) (merge of child abuse with underlying sex offenses for sentencing)
- White v. State, 318 Md. 740 (Md. 1990) (ambiguity in legislative intent; merger principles under Art. 27, § 35A)
- Lancaster v. State, 332 Md. 385 (Md. 1993) (required evidence test for multi-purpose offenses)
- Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (U.S. 1981) (legislative intent can override merger under Blockburger)
- Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (U.S. 1983) (legislature may authorize cumulative punishment)
- Jones v. State, 414 Md. 686 (Md. 2010) (remand for new sentence when merger required; mitigate rights)
- Purnell v. State, 375 Md. 678 (Md. 2003) (double jeopardy and separate punishment principles)