Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Tong
930 F.3d 65
2d Cir.2019Background
- Tweed-New Haven Airport (Tweed) operates a primary commercial runway (Runway 2/20) currently limited to 5,600 feet by Connecticut law (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120j(c)), enacted in 2009 to block runway expansion.
- The runway length materially limits aircraft types, passenger loads, and destinations; airlines have declined service or limited seating because of the restriction.
- Tweed’s FAA‑approved Master Plan (2002) called for extending the runway (up to 7,200 feet); the FAA exercises direct oversight over the airport and any ALP modifications.
- Tweed sued the Connecticut Attorney General seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the state statute is preempted by the Federal Aviation Act (FAAct) and other federal statutes; the City of New Haven intervened.
- The district court found Tweed lacked Article III standing and alternatively held that federal law did not preempt the state statute; the Second Circuit reversed, holding Tweed has standing and the Runway Statute is preempted by the FAAct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing — injury-in-fact, causation, redressability | Tweed: statute directly bars runway extension and creates concrete, traceable injury and will be redressed by invalidation | State: no enforcement threat and other contingencies (funding, permits) break causation | Tweed has Article III standing: threatened enforcement and the statute as an absolute barrier satisfy injury, causation, and redressability |
| Ability of a political subdivision to sue its state under the Supremacy Clause | Tweed: subdivisions may sue state when state law conflicts with federal law | State: historical precedents limit subdivisions from suing their state | A political subdivision may sue its state under the Supremacy Clause; precedents permitting such suits control |
| Preemption — does the FAAct preempt the Runway Statute? | Tweed: FAAct occupies the field of air safety, including runway length; state ban intrudes on uniform federal regulation and affects aircraft safety and capacity | State: statute does not prevent compliance with federal safety mandates and no federal mandate requires runway extension; no implied preemption | The FAAct impliedly preempts the Runway Statute: field preemption of air safety covers runway length; the state’s absolute ban conflicts with federal regulatory scheme |
| Relevance of federal oversight and airport size to preemption | Tweed: FAA approval of Master Plan and Part 139 classification show strong federal interest, so field preemption applies | State: preemption less likely for small/local matters | FAA’s significant involvement with Tweed supports preemption; Tweed is not a small airport exempt from FAAct preemption |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires injury‑in‑fact, causation, redressability)
- MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (pre‑enforcement declaratory relief; plaintiffs need not risk prosecution to challenge a statute)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (threatened enforcement can create standing)
- Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (contingencies do not defeat standing where challenged action is an absolute barrier)
- Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (states’ legislative control over subdivisions is constrained by federal law)
- Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218 (2d Cir.) (FAAct creates uniform federal system for air safety; preemption scope)
- Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206 (2d Cir.) (FAAct impliedly preempts the field of air safety)
- Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125 (municipalities may bring Supremacy Clause challenges)
- City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (federal objective of uniform air safety regulation)