Turubchuk v. E.T. Simonds Construction Company
3:12-cv-00594
| S.D. Ill. | Mar 8, 2018Background
- Defendants SIAC and ETS disclosed retained expert G. Patrick Murphy and later served a Second Supplemental Report after the court previously struck an earlier supplement as legally deficient.
- The court had earlier (Oct. 24, 2017) struck Murphy’s supplemental opinions for being legal conclusions, speculative, and lacking Daubert-compliant methodology, but gave defendants one final opportunity to cure defects.
- Plaintiffs moved to strike Murphy’s Second Supplemental Report; defendants opposed but effectively preserved opinions the court had already found inadmissible.
- Murphy’s report opined (among other things) that the plaintiff driver was the sole proximate cause, the roadway markings were proper, and insurers would have acted differently if policies had been disclosed — opinions the court found irrelevant, speculative, or lacking foundation.
- The court held the proper damages measure is the reasonable settlement value at the time of the 2007 settlement based on facts known or foreseeable then; Murphy relied on evidence developed years later and did not show that those facts affected settlement decisions in 2007.
- The court found Murphy unqualified to opine on roadway marking issues and that his insurance-opinion speculation lacked foundation; it granted Plaintiffs’ motion to strike and barred Murphy from testifying to the challenged opinions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Murphy’s opinions under Rule 702/Daubert | Murphy’s opinions are irrelevant, speculative, legal conclusions, and lack methodology | Murphy is a qualified retained expert whose opinions should be admitted | Excluded: opinions are inadmissible under Daubert and Rule 702 |
| Relevance of opinions about underlying liability | Underlying liability is irrelevant to fraud/ misrepresentation damages here | Liability opinions inform damages and settlement valuation | Liability opinions are irrelevant to plaintiff’s claims and thus inadmissible except possibly on damages; here excluded |
| Use of post-settlement evidence to value 2007 settlement | Damages measure is settlement value at time of settlement based on facts known/foreseeable then; later evidence is hindsight | Murphy relied on later-developed reports and testimony to reach conclusions | Excluded: later-developed evidence cannot be used to retroactively justify 2007 settlement value absent proof it was considered then |
| Foundation for opinions about insurers’ expected actions | Murphy’s insurance conclusions are speculative and unsupported | Murphy can opine from industry experience about insurers’ likely responses | Excluded: opinions speculative, lacked foundation and direct inquiry with insurers or defense counsel |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (trial judge gatekeeping function for expert testimony)
- U.S. v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244 (7th Cir. 2004) (experts must explain how experience reliably leads to conclusions)
- U.S. v. Mamah, 332 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2003) (need factual link between data and expert conclusion)
- Zenith Elec. Corp. v. WH-T Broad. Corp., 395 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2005) (expert cannot rely on mere invocation of expertise)
- Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (courts may exclude expert conclusions lacking a reliable basis)
- Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1999) (experts must substantiate opinions; speculation inadmissible)
- Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting speculative expert opinion)
- U.S. v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2009) (excluding unsupported conclusory expert testimony)
