Turpin v. Ray
319 F. Supp. 3d 191
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- Turpin was a long-term tenant; landlord Ray obtained a judgment of possession and a Writ of Restitution that expired without U.S. Marshals executing an eviction. Ray later changed the locks; Turpin re-entered the unit by breaking a rear door.
- Ray called police; an initial responding unit declined to intervene as a civil matter. Later Officers Rowley and Strange arrived, were told by Ray about the eviction judgment, spoke with Turpin (who admitted forced entry), entered the apartment, arrested and removed Turpin.
- Turpin was prosecuted on destruction of property and resisting arrest, tried, and acquitted. He sued Rowley, Strange, the District of Columbia (municipal liability), and Ray under § 1983 (Fourth Amendment illegal entry, false arrest, malicious prosecution) and D.C. common law torts.
- Officers Rowley and Strange, the District, and Ray moved to dismiss. The Court evaluated constitutional claims and qualified immunity at the 12(b)(6) stage.
- The Court granted dismissal of Turpin’s § 1983 claims against the officers (illegal entry, false arrest, malicious prosecution) on qualified immunity grounds, dismissed the municipal § 1983 claim without prejudice (conceded by plaintiff), and remanded remaining state-law claims to D.C. Superior Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Illegal entry (§ 1983) | Officers entered without warrant or exigency; Turpin retained Fourth Amendment privacy after writ expired without execution | Officers had consent of landlord and facts (eviction judgment, forced re-entry) that made arrest/entry reasonable; qualified immunity | Dismissed as to officers: qualified immunity applies (no clearly established violation under facts) |
| False arrest (§ 1983) | Arrest was warrantless and lacked probable cause | Officers reasonably believed a crime occurred (broken door, eviction judgment); qualified immunity protects reasonable mistakes | Dismissed as to officers: qualified immunity (probable-cause question not clearly established to defeat immunity) |
| Malicious prosecution (§ 1983) | Officers initiated criminal proceedings knowing arrest was unlawful, causing post-charge deprivation of liberty | No predicate constitutional seizure alleged; law on what post-charge "seizure" suffices is unsettled; immunity applies | Dismissed as to officers: qualified immunity; plaintiff failed to plead a clearly established predicate seizure |
| Municipal liability (§ 1983) | District failed to train/discipline, demonstrating deliberate indifference on warrantless entry issues | District moved to dismiss; plaintiff withdrew the claim (reserved right to reinstate) | Municipal claim dismissed without prejudice (plaintiff conceded and may reinstate after discovery) |
Key Cases Cited
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qual. immunity two-step framework and early-stage resolution)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (qualified immunity standard)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (warrantless entry into home presumptively unreasonable)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (qualified immunity analysis and requirement to consider clearly established law)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (need for particularized precedent to defeat qualified immunity)
- Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (probable cause standard)
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (distinguishing false arrest from malicious prosecution)
- Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d 494 (malicious prosecution actionable under § 1983 when prosecution causes Fourth Amendment "seizure")
- Amobi v. D.C. Dept. of Corrections, 755 F.3d 980 (probable cause is mixed question of law and fact; ordinarily for jury)