Turner v. State, 2017 Ark. 253

Trozzie Turner was arrested March 9, 2006; trial occurred October 8, 2008 (944 days after arrest), exceeding the one-year speedy-trial period by 581 days.
Turner was convicted of multiple drug offenses and later sought postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds.
In the first appeal, this Court remanded for the circuit court to make specific findings about which periods of delay were excludable under the speedy-trial rules. Turner v. State, 2016 Ark. 96, 486 S.W.3d 757.
On remand, the circuit court found that continuances requested by defense counsel (with the defendant’s consent) produced excludable periods totaling more than 581 days, so no speedy-trial violation occurred and counsel’s failure to move to dismiss was not deficient.
Turner challenged three continuum orders that excluded time "until the date a trial is set," arguing Rule 28.3 requires a day-certain continuance to exclude time; the court rejected this argument because the record memorialized the defendant-requested continuances.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, holding the circuit court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss for speedy-trial violation	Turner: counsel should have moved; prima facie violation existed because trial occurred >1 year after arrest	State: excluded periods (defense-requested continuances) bring trial within one year; counsel not deficient	Court: Counsel not deficient because continuances requested by defense produced >581 days excludable; no violation
Whether continuances that do not set a day-certain are excludable under Rule 28.3	Turner: orders that exclude time "until date trial is set" are insufficient; Rule 28.3 requires a specific date	State/Court: contemporaneous record showing defendant-requested continuances suffices even if no day-certain appears	Court: Such orders are acceptable when the record memorializes defendant-requested continuances; no automatic reversal
Whether Bradford requires reversal when orders lack day-certain language	Turner: Bradford supports reversal when the record does not attribute delay to defendant	State/Court: Bradford concerned poor recordkeeping and missing orders; not analogous here	Court: Distinguished Bradford; record here contained orders attributing delay to defendant
Standard of review for denial of postconviction relief	Turner: (implicit) circuit court erred in findings	State: circuit court findings not clearly erroneous; Strickland governs	Court: Applied Strickland; declined to reverse absent clear error

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118 (burden shifts to State to show good cause once prima facie speedy-trial violation is shown)
Bradford v. State, 329 Ark. 620 (reversal where record failed to show delay attributable to defendant due to poor recordkeeping)
Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105 (contemporaneous record memorializing defendant-requested delays can satisfy Rule 28.3)
Miles v. State, 348 Ark. 544 (treatment of excludable periods under speedy-trial rules)
Barrett v. State, 371 Ark. 91 (definition of clearly erroneous standard on appellate review)