Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507

South Carolina family court uses civil contempt to enforce child support orders, imprisoning nonpaying obligors who are able to pay.
Turner, an indigent noncustodial parent, was found in contempt and sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment after an uncounseled hearing in 2008.
The court did not make explicit findings on Turner’s ability to pay, nor provide notice that ability-to-pay was the key issue, and used a preprinted form with a blank ability-to-pay finding.
Turner appealed after release; state supreme court rejected a right-to-counsel claim, distinguishing civil from criminal contempt and relying on non-binding authorities.
This Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires state-paid counsel in civil contempt for child support but did not address mootness until after briefing.
The majority concludes that the Due Process Clause does not automatically require counsel where alternative procedural safeguards ensuring fairness are in place, while Turner dissents on the breadth of that rule.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Right to counsel in civil contempt for child support	Turner asserts indigents have a right to state-paid counsel at civil contempt hearings.	Respondents argue no categorical due-process right to counsel in civil contempt; safeguards suffice.	No automatic right to counsel; but safeguards may suffice.
Mootness	Turner’s dispute remains live due to potential future imprisonments.	Case moot after Turner’s sentence ended and no collateral consequences.	Not moot; falls within capable-of-repetition, evading review.
Adequacy of substitute safeguards	Counsel is necessary to ensure fairness and correct ability-to-pay determinations.	Alternative safeguards (notice, financial-information form, opportunity to respond, explicit pay finding) suffice to preserve fairness.	Substitute safeguards can satisfy due process; counsel not required absent a contrary showing.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (limits due process in noncriminal proceedings and supports limited counsel rights)
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile delinquency right to counsel; functionally akin to criminal trial)
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (indigent-right-to-counsel depends on potential loss of liberty)
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ( Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases)
Dixon v. United States, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (supports limited due process protections in civil contexts)
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (due process counseling/psych assessment considerations; not controlling here)