493 P.3d 117
Wash.2021Background
- Kent Turner, a veteran with advanced multiple sclerosis, qualified for Medicaid-funded long-term care after CARE assessments; he could operate his wheelchair independently but required help with transfers and ADLs.
- DSHS performed CARE assessments and enrolled Kent in the Roads to Community Living (RCL) program; Kent signed waivers opting for community-based care and moved from a nursing facility into an apartment at Capitol House.
- DSHS contracted with third parties (Life Therapeutic Works, ResCare) and transferred case management to the Lewis-Mason-Thurston Area Agency on Aging (LMTAAA); in-home attendants provided ~4 hours/day of care.
- Kent died alone in his apartment from an accidental fire; investigation could not definitively identify the ignition source (fire localized to Kent/wheelchair); apartment had alarms but no sprinklers.
- Kent’s estate sued DSHS and LMTAAA for negligence and abuse/neglect; trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding no special relationship, no breach or proximate cause, and no AVAA cause against DSHS/LMTAAA; the Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DSHS owed a special protective duty to Kent (special relationship) | DSHS encouraged/moved Kent into lesser-care community placement for cost reasons and thereby assumed protective responsibility | DSHS merely facilitated a client-centered choice; Kent retained decision-making and independence so no entrustment/custody | No special relationship; no heightened protective duty (affirmed) |
| Whether LMTAAA/DSHS breached ordinary negligence duties and proximately caused death | Failure to monitor care, implement/practice evacuation plan, provide emergency device, investigate complaints created actionable breach causing death | Monitoring duties were limited; injury unrelated to monitoring/in-home care and causation is speculative | No triable breach or proximate cause as a matter of law (affirmed) |
| Whether a private implied cause of action exists under chapter 74.39A RCW | Statutory monitoring and protective provisions create enforceable private rights for vulnerable clients | Chapter 74.39A is a public-assistance statute benefiting public interest; remedies/administrative enforcement exist and implying a private cause would conflict with statutory scheme | No implied private cause of action (affirmed) |
| Whether AVAA (RCW 74.34.200) creates a private claim against DSHS/LMTAAA | AVAA authorizes damages for vulnerable-adult neglect or abuse | AVAA’s private cause applies only to licensed providers/individual providers; DSHS/AAAs are not covered defendants and DSHS has investigatory role | AVAA claim dismissed as to DSHS and LMTAAA (affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- H.B.H. v. State, 192 Wn.2d 154 (2018) (special-protective duty requires entrustment/dependence and foreseeability)
- Caulfield v. Kitsap County, 108 Wn. App. 242 (2001) (special relationship where case manager directly hired/monitored 24-hour in‑home caregiver)
- Donohoe v. State, 135 Wn. App. 824 (2006) (distinguishing Caulfield where DSHS did not select/oversee facility care)
- Brown v. MacPherson’s, Inc., 86 Wn.2d 293 (1975) (voluntary undertaking/rescue doctrine creates duty when reliance prevents alternative help)
- Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wn.2d 912 (1989) (three‑part test for implying private causes of action from statutes)
- Braam v. State, 150 Wn.2d 689 (2003) (declining implied private remedy where it would conflict with DSHS’s broad administrative authority)