Turcios v. DeBruler Co.
2014 IL App (2d) 130331
Ill. App. Ct.2014Background
- Plaintiffs Turcios and Alice and Nelsyn Caceres-Ortiz appeal Lake County circuit court’s dismissal of counts IV (wrongful death) and V (survival) against DeBruler Co. for death by suicide allegedly caused by defendant’s intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- Lease and eviction: April 20, 2011 lease for Colonial Park Apartments; May 10 eviction notice with 30 days to vacate; building to be demolished beginning June 10; notice of last day June 9; free rent offer.
- Demolition around decedent’s unit; demolition began June 22 despite occupancy; family displaced and belongings damaged in a rainstorm.
- June 15, 2011, Nelsyn Caceres suicided in the apartment after the distressing conditions; family’s emotional distress alleged as proximate cause.
- Plaintiffs alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress; trial court dismissed counts IV and V with prejudice under 735 ILCS 5/2-615, ruling suicide bars wrongful death and survival claims under Illinois law.
- Court vacated the dismissal and remanded to reconsider in light of its opinion, recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress can support wrongful death/survival claims when the distress is a substantial factor in causing suicide.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Can wrongful death and survivorship actions proceed where suicide is tied to an intentional tort? | Suicide can be caused by the defendant’s intentional distress and is not an intervening cause. | Suicide is an intervening cause that bars recovery in both wrongful death and survival actions. | Yes; suicide is not a per se bar in intentional tort cases; causation question for trial. |
| What causation standard applies to IIED when suicide is involved? | Distress must be a substantial factor in bringing about the suicide. | Legal cause/foreseeability limits liability; intervening cause analysis may apply. | Liability may extend where distress is a substantial factor; no automatic bar from suicide. |
| Should Illinois adopt foreign authorities’ substantial-factor approach or restrict to intervening-cause rules? | Foreign authorities support holding defendants liable for suicides caused by intentional distress. | Intervening-cause/foreseeability principles should limit liability. | Illinois does not adopt a foreign “substantial-factor” exception; remedy under ordinary tort principles with proximate-cause analysis for IIED. |
Key Cases Cited
- Adams v. Sussman & Hertzberg, Ltd., 292 Ill. App. 3d 30 (1997) (elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress; foreseeability as causation component)
- Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85 (1976) (IIED can be proven where intent and severe distress are shown)
- Knysak v. Shelter Life Insurance Co., 273 Ill. App. 3d 360 (1995) (causation focus in IIED; damages tied to distress)
- Beretta U.S.A. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 351 (2004) (substantial-factor test as a causation concept in Illinois law)
- Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 56 Ill. App. 3d 111 (1978) (causation principles in Illinois IIED cases)
- Luss v. Village of Forest Park, 377 Ill. App. 3d 318 (2007) (negligence suicide as intervening cause; distinction with intentional torts)