Tuma v. Britt, DA 25-0739

The dispute concerns a non-subdividable 38.2-acre Parent Tract in Flathead County that was subject to a 1992 long-term lease with an option-to-purchase clause in Section 5. 1
Section 5 of the 1992 Lease contained two paragraphs: a fee-simple purchase option and a separate contingency option to purchase a tenancy-in-common interest if subdivision remained unavailable. 2
In 2018, the Britts acquired the leasehold, and the Second Lease Amendment stated, 'Paragraph 5. Option to purchase' was removed. 3
The Second Lease Amendment also stated the assignees had 'paid in full' for the 6.325-acre tract and did not need to purchase it, and a 2020 Third Amendment expanded the leasehold to 10.325 acres. 4
After the Tumas bought the Parent Tract, they sued, and the Britts counterclaimed for a declaration that their tenancy-in-common right had vested and been paid in full. 5
The district court granted partial summary judgment to the Britts, found the amendment ambiguous, considered extrinsic evidence, and ordered the Tumas to convey a 27.5% tenancy-in-common interest. 6

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the Second Lease Amendment ambiguous? 7	Tumas: it unambiguously removed all of Section 5.	Britts: it removed only the first paragraph's fee purchase option.	Ambiguous; reasonably supports both readings. 8
Could extrinsic evidence show the parties preserved the tenancy-in-common option? 9	Tumas: parol evidence barred and Amendment eliminated the option.	Britts: ambiguity allowed evidence showing the option remained.	Yes; extrinsic evidence properly showed the option survived. 10
Did Don Hostak's deposition create a factual dispute? 11	Tumas: his deposition contradicted the Joint Declaration.	Britts: it showed only memory lapses, not contradiction.	No; deposition did not create a genuine factual dispute. 12

BMK Enters. v. Bailey Enters. of Mont., LLC, 589 P.3d 620 (Mont. 2026) (summary judgment and contract ambiguity principles 13)
Mary J. Baker Revocable Tr. v. Cenex Harvest States, Coops., Inc., 164 P.3d 851 (Mont. 2007) (unambiguous contracts are enforced as written; ambiguity permits intent evidence 14)
AWIN Real Estate, LLC v. Whitehead Homes, Inc., 472 P.3d 165 (Mont. 2020) (ambiguous contract intent may be resolved on summary judgment when extrinsic evidence is undisputed 15)
Richards v. JTL Grp., Inc., 212 P.3d 264 (Mont. 2009) (clear contract language must be applied as written 16)
K&R P'ship v. City of Whitefish, 189 P.3d 593 (Mont. 2008) (courts consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain intent from ambiguous text 17)
Olson v. Jude, 73 P.3d 809 (Mont. 2003) (extrinsic evidence may be used when a written instrument is ambiguous 18)
Becker v. Rosebud Operating Servs., 191 P.3d 435 (Mont. 2008) (memory lapses or speculative assertions do not defeat summary judgment 19)
Stott v. Fox, 805 P.2d 1305 (Mont. 1990) (nonmovant must present material and substantial evidence, not conjecture 20)