Tucker v. State, 87, 2017

Background

In 2013 a jury convicted Lynell Tucker of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; he received life plus a term of years and this Court affirmed on direct appeal.
Tucker filed a Rule 61 postconviction motion and requested counsel in April 2015; counsel was appointed, reviewed the record, then moved to withdraw under Superior Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(6); the Superior Court allowed withdrawal and denied relief in February 2017.
Tucker appealed the denial; new appellate counsel filed a Rule 26(c) brief and motion to withdraw, concluding there were no arguably appealable issues; Tucker filed a response raising several ineffective-assistance claims.
The underlying facts: on September 14, 2011 Dominique Helm was shot in the back outside his mother’s home; multiple eyewitnesses implicated Tucker and his father, Tony Dunn; Tucker fled to Florida and was arrested hiding in a trunk; Dunn testified at trial that another person (Devin Marsh) fired the fatal shot.
Tucker claimed (in postconviction and on appeal) that counsel in the postconviction process and at trial were ineffective: (1) postconviction/appellate counsel improperly moved to withdraw; (2) trial counsel suffered a conflict of interest from prior Public Defender representation; (3) trial counsel failed to provide witness statements; and (4) trial counsel failed to pursue a mental‑health/insanity defense.
The Supreme Court reviewed counsel’s Rule 26(c) submission and the record, applied Strickland standards, and affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief, granting the State’s motion to affirm.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Tucker)	Defendant's Argument (State / Counsel)	Held
Whether postconviction/appellate counsel were ineffective for moving to withdraw	Counsel abandoned Tucker by moving to withdraw and did not press his desired claims	Rule 61(e)(6) and Rule 26(c) permit counsel to withdraw when no meritorious claim can be ethically advanced; withdrawal alone is not ineffective assistance	Denied — counsel’s withdrawal was permissible and not per se ineffective
Whether trial counsel had a disqualifying conflict of interest from prior Public Defender representation	Prior Public Defender representation of Tucker created a conflict impairing trial counsel’s effectiveness	Tucker cited no facts showing a conflict or resulting prejudice	Denied — no concrete allegation or proof of conflict or prejudice
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide witness statements to Tucker	Tucker was not given witness statements and that impaired his defense	Defense showed counsel explained protective-order restrictions on disclosure and Tucker did not press the issue at trial	Denied — no specificity, no showing of prejudice
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not pursuing an insanity/mental‑health defense alongside a factual innocence defense	Counsel should have pursued an insanity defense as an alternative if Tucker was the shooter	Counsel reasonably pursued a factual‑innocence strategy after mental‑health evaluation and competency proceedings; an insanity defense could undermine the innocence theory	Denied — counsel’s strategy was reasonable and consistent with record and competency rulings

Key Cases Cited

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (U.S. 1988) (standard for appellate counsel’s brief when seeking withdrawal)
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429 (U.S. 1988) (appellate‑counsel obligations when finding no nonfrivolous issues)
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967) (procedures for appointed counsel who finds appeal frivolous)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance standard)
Duross v. State, 494 A.2d 1265 (Del. 1985) (state law on scope of appellate review of postconviction ineffective‑assistance claims)
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552 (Del. 1990) (requiring concrete showing of conflict or prejudice for disqualification)