Tucker v. Gaddis, 40 F.4th 289

TDCJ historically controlled two forms of inmate worship: weekly primary services for ten recognized religions (led by chaplains) and secondary services led by approved external volunteers subject to Committee approval and time/space/security limits.
From 2007–2014 TDCJ treated Nation of Gods and Earths adherents as Muslim and allowed access to primary services; in 2014 the Committee reclassified the Nation as a racial-supremacy group and imposed a categorical ban on their congregating.
Tucker (initially pro se) sued under RLUIPA seeking a declaration that TDCJ must allow the Nation secondary services (i.e., to congregate); the district court dismissed, finding the ban was the least restrictive means.
This Court in Tucker v. Collier (Tucker I) vacated and remanded, finding factual disputes about whether the ban advanced a compelling interest by least restrictive means; case returned to district court.
While on remand TDCJ changed policy: recategorized the Nation as Islamic (restoring primary services) and allowed applications for secondary services, but continued to condition approval on time, place, and security concerns and required an approved external volunteer.
The district court found those policy changes mooted Tucker’s claim; this panel reverses, holding the changes do not render the case moot because they merely permit applications and TDCJ gave no assurance it will not revert to prior restrictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether TDCJ's policy changes moot Tucker's RLUIPA claim	Tucker: No — he sought concrete accommodation (scheduled time/venue to assemble), not merely the ability to apply	TDCJ: Yes — Nation now on same footing as other faiths; Tucker can apply for secondary services	Not moot — change only allows applications; no guarantee of approval and no permanent assurance; heavy burden unmet
Standard for mootness when government voluntarily ceases challenged conduct	Tucker: Voluntary change insufficient absent assurance it won't recur; past practices show risk of return	TDCJ: Its policy change is bona fide and removes live controversy	Court: Applies stringent standard — defendant bears heavy/formidable burden to show conduct won’t recur; TDCJ failed to meet it
Effect of administrative barriers (volunteer requirement; time/space/security) on relief	Tucker: These barriers leave the asserted injury intact because Texas never approved a Nation congregation	TDCJ: Practical constraints (no volunteers, security concerns) justify continued case closure and equal treatment	Court: Administrative constraints mean plaintiff still lacks the relief he sought; possibility/probability of administrative denial does not moot the case

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982) (voluntary cessation does not moot suit unless wrongful behavior cannot reasonably be expected to recur)
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (2013) (defendant cannot automatically moot a case by ending challenged conduct)
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (defendant bears heavy burden to show challenged conduct will not recur)
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (‘‘absolutely clear’’ standard for mootness after voluntary cessation)
Tucker v. Collier, 906 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2018) (vacated dismissal and remanded on RLUIPA congregation claim; genuine factual disputes on compelling interest/least restrictive means)
Yarls v. Bunton, 905 F.3d 905 (5th Cir. 2018) (courts should beware ‘‘litigation posturing’’ in mootness contexts)
El Paso Elec. Co. v. FERC, 667 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1982) (possibility that separate administrative proceedings might provide relief does not moot a case)