Trustgard Insurance Company v. Charles Herndon
338 Ga. App. 347
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- On April 11, 2013, Charles Herndon shot Vivian Welker; she incurred about $55,000 in medical bills and claimed under Herndon’s homeowner policy issued by Trustgard.
- Trustgard denied coverage relying on (a) Intentional Acts Exclusions (willful/intentional acts; foreseeable results) and (b) a Criminal Act Exclusion (bodily injury arising from a criminal act by an insured).
- Herndon claimed the shooting was accidental; he later pled guilty to misdemeanor reckless conduct and was sentenced as a first offender (probation).
- Trustgard sued for a declaratory judgment that it had no coverage; the trial court granted Herndon summary judgment on the Intentional Acts exclusions and initially denied Trustgard summary judgment on the Criminal Act Exclusion, excluding evidence of Herndon’s plea.
- Afterward the trial court (over Trustgard’s objection and while Trustgard’s appeal was pending) granted Herndon summary judgment on the Criminal Act Exclusion as well; Trustgard appealed both orders.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Trustgard) | Defendant's Argument (Herndon) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Herndon’s guilty plea as a first offender is admissible evidence that a criminal act occurred such that the Criminal Act Exclusion applies | The guilty plea is admissible as an admission and prima facie evidence that a criminal act occurred; it supports summary judgment for insurer | The First Offender plea is not an adjudication of guilt and thus cannot be used to trigger the exclusion | Guilty plea is admissible evidence (even under First Offender); trial court erred in excluding it — admission is prima facie evidence of criminal conduct |
| Whether Trustgard was entitled to summary judgment under the Criminal Act Exclusion after considering the plea | The plea establishes the exclusion applies and no evidence rebuts it, so insurer entitled to summary judgment | Affidavit and victim testimony claim accident, creating genuine dispute | Court reversed trial court: Trustgard entitled to summary judgment under the Criminal Act Exclusion because Herndon did not rebut his guilty plea |
| Whether the Intentional Acts Exclusions independently bar coverage | (Alternate) Policy also excludes intentional or willful acts; insurer argued exclusion applies | Herndon argued shooting was accidental, so intentional exclusions do not apply | Court did not decide on this ground because Criminal Act ruling disposed of coverage; remanded with direction to enter summary judgment for insurer on Criminal Act Exclusion |
| Whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to rule on Herndon’s second summary-judgment motion while Trustgard’s appeal was pending | Trustgard argued pending appeal divested trial court of jurisdiction; thus order invalid | Herndon proceeded and obtained ruling despite appeal | Court reversed the trial-court grant to Herndon on Criminal Act Exclusion (on merits); remanded to vacate Herndon’s judgment and enter judgment for Trustgard |
Key Cases Cited
- Nguyen v. Southwestern Emergency Physicians, P.C., 298 Ga. 75 (appellate standard for summary judgment review)
- Pait v. City of Albany, 335 Ga. App. 215 (first-offender guilty plea treated as guilty plea and admissible)
- Hasty v. Spruill, 207 Ga. App. 485 (guilty plea is admission against interest and prima facie evidence)
- Merritt v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 218 Ga. App. 652 (guilty plea can support insurer’s summary judgment where insured fails to reconcile plea and later contrary testimony)
- Moss v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 212 Ga. App. 326 (prior guilty plea can defeat claim that incident was accidental)
- Harden v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 269 Ga. App. 732 (guilty plea sufficient to establish exclusion for intentional acts)