Truman Medical Centers, Inc. v. John E. McKay
2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 1315
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- On March 12, 2014 Stephanie Jo Middleton was injured in a car crash; Truman Medical treated her and billed $2,673.69.
- Truman Medical sent a hospital-lien notice to State Farm (the insurer) listing Middleton, the date, the hospital, and stating the identity of the at-fault person was unknown.
- Attorney John McKay represented Middleton; Truman Medical sent him letters informing him of the lien before settlement but did not (and could not) send Section 430.240-style notice to the named tortfeasor because Truman did not know the tortfeasor’s identity.
- State Farm settled with Middleton through McKay and paid settlement funds to McKay, who forwarded them to Middleton without satisfying Truman Medical’s lien.
- Truman Medical sued State Farm and McKay under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 430.250; State Farm was dismissed by stipulation and the trial court granted McKay’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Section 430.250 does not apply to an injured party’s attorney who merely receives and forwards settlement funds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 430.250 liability extends to an attorney who receives and forwards settlement proceeds to the client | Truman: § 430.250’s phrase “any person” includes McKay because he made payment to Middleton after receiving notice and thus is liable for the hospital lien | McKay: § 430.250 is limited to the party alleged to be liable for the injury; an attorney is not liable to the client for the injury and merely forwards client funds, not personally compensates the client | Held: § 430.250 does not apply to attorneys in McKay’s role; attorney is neither the tortfeasor nor a payer "as compensation" for the injury, so no claim stated |
Key Cases Cited
- Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 476 S.W.3d 913 (Mo. banc 2016) (standard of review for motion to dismiss)
- McIlvoy v. Sharp, 485 S.W.3d 367 (Mo. App. 2016) (petition must invoke substantive law to state a claim)
- Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189 (Mo. banc 2014) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo; give effect to plain language)
- Bateman v. Rinehart, 391 S.W.3d 441 (Mo. banc 2013) (look beyond plain meaning only if ambiguous or absurd)
- BASF Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 392 S.W.3d 438 (Mo. banc 2012) (rules for resolving statutory ambiguities and discerning legislative intent)