Truitt v. Salisbury Bank and Trust Co., 52 F.4th 80

William Truitt was hired as a full-time mortgage lending officer trainee (at-will) in Feb 2018; he was also a part-time county legislator.
On April 12, 2018 Truitt announced his campaign for the NY State Assembly; he then notified Bank management and supplied a letter describing the part-time nature of the Assembly role.
Bank policy required disclosure/approval of outside employment; Bank managers concluded serving as an Assembly member would conflict with the mortgage-originator position and told Truitt to choose by May 1, 2018.
Truitt elected to continue his campaign, emailed that decision on May 1, and his employment ended (Bank recorded April 30 as last day). He lost the election.
Truitt sued under N.Y. Lab. Law § 201-d alleging he was discharged because of protected political activity; the district court granted summary judgment for the Bank, finding he voluntarily resigned and was not constructively discharged.
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, holding a reasonable jury could find the Bank forced an unlawful choice (an adverse employment action) and that the Bank failed to show a non-discriminatory justification for forbidding the campaign.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Bank's ultimatum (run or keep job) constituted an adverse employment action/constructive discharge	Truitt: Bank "forced" him to choose between protected political activity and employment; resignation was involuntary and thus discharge for protected activity	Bank: Truitt voluntarily resigned; no adverse employment action occurred	Vacated: reasonable jury could find Bank impermissibly forced the choice and thereby discriminated — adverse action exists
Whether Bank presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason (time/attendance/conflict) or whether that reason was pretextual	Truitt: Bank's stated reasons conflate campaigning with serving in office and lack evidence that campaigning interfered with work; therefore pretext	Bank: Serving in Assembly would require substantial time (Albany session) and create a legitimate conflict with the job	Vacated: jury could find Bank failed to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for forbidding the campaign; question of pretext for trial

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for employment discrimination claims)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2000) (proof of pretext and effect on burden-shifting)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (standard for summary judgment and genuine dispute)
Dish Network Corp. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 21 F.4th 207 (2d Cir. 2021) (de novo review of summary judgment; construe facts for nonmovant)
McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary judgment standard in employment cases)
Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 317 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (ultimatum forcing employee to choose can support constructive discharge claim)