Troy Victorino v. State of Florida
241 So. 3d 48
Fla.2018Background
- Troy Victorino was convicted in 2006 of multiple crimes, including six counts of first-degree murder; the jury recommended death for four murders and life for two, and the trial court imposed four death sentences.
- This Court affirmed convictions and sentences on direct appeal and later affirmed denial of his initial postconviction relief petition.
- After the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida and this Court’s subsequent Hurst-related decisions, Victorino filed a successive Rule 3.851 motion seeking relief from his death sentences.
- The postconviction court granted relief in part, vacating the death sentences and ordering new penalty-phase proceedings, but denied Victorino’s requests to have the death sentences commuted to life under § 775.082(2), and denied his double jeopardy and ex post facto claims.
- Victorino appealed the portions of the postconviction order denying commutation, double jeopardy, and ex post facto relief; this opinion affirms those denials.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Victorino) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 775.082(2) requires commutation of his vacated death sentences to life | §775.082(2) mandates life sentences when death penalty is held unconstitutional; mass-murder facts and multiple vacated death sentences warrant commutation | Prior precedent (this Court’s Hurst-related decisions) interprets §775.082(2) not to require commutation in Hurst-type vacaturs | Court rejects Victorino’s request and declines to reinterpret §775.082(2) — no commutation required |
| Whether reprosecution or a new penalty phase violates double jeopardy | Nonunanimous jury recommendations amount to acquittal of death; retrial/resentencing would violate double jeopardy | Hurst holdings do not acquit defendants; retrial of penalty phase does not implicate double jeopardy | Court holds double jeopardy does not bar a new penalty phase; Victorino not acquitted of death |
| Whether applying Hurst-era requirements retroactively to make him death-eligible violates ex post facto clause | Retroactive application of new unanimous-jury requirements increases penalty exposure or changes law unfavorably | The revised Florida capital scheme does not alter criminal definitions nor increase the statutory penalty; it imposes procedural requirements | Court holds application is not an ex post facto violation; no relief granted |
Key Cases Cited
- Hurst v. Florida, [citation="136 S. Ct. 616"] (U.S. 2016) (held Florida’s sentencing scheme unconstitutional for assigning judge critical findings)
- Hurst v. State, [citation="202 So. 3d 40"] (Fla. 2016) (applying Hurst to Florida capital cases)
- Mosley v. State, [citation="209 So. 3d 1248"] (Fla. 2016) (addressing remedy and resentencing issues post-Hurst)
- Franklin v. State, [citation="209 So. 3d 1241"] (Fla. 2016) (interpreting §775.082(2) in Hurst context)
- Victorino v. State, [citation="23 So. 3d 87"] (Fla. 2009) (direct appeal affirming convictions and sentences)
- Victorino v. State, [citation="127 So. 3d 478"] (Fla. 2013) (affirming denial of initial postconviction relief)
- Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, [citation="537 U.S. 101"] (U.S. 2003) (retrial of capital defendant does not implicate double jeopardy)
- Lynce v. Mathis, [citation="519 U.S. 433"] (U.S. 1997) (ex post facto analysis requires law be retrospective and disadvantageous)