Troy Shaw v. Bill Wilson, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14991

Shaw, aged 18, was convicted of murder in Indiana after the state amended the information from aggravated battery to murder following testimony from codefendants who pleaded guilty.
The 1982 version of Indiana Code § 35-34-1-5 restricted amendments of substance to within 30 days before the omnibus date; amendments of form could occur with less prejudice.
Shaw’s trial occurred after the amendment; his counsel sought a continuance to prepare for the murder defense, which was granted for two months.
On appeal, Shaw’s appellate lawyer abandoned the stronger claim that the amendment was improper under the statute and pursued a weaker sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge.
Shaw pursued post-conviction relief in state court, which was denied, and then sought federal review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
The district court denied relief, but the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the Indiana appellate court’s decision was an unreasonable application of Strickland.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Miller deficient for abandoning the substantial amendment-authorization claim?	Shaw asserts Miller should have raised the Haak/Fajardo-based amendment challenge as clearly stronger.	Miller chose what he believed was the promissory sufficiency claim, a reasonable trial strategy.	Yes; Miller's abandonment was deficient performance.
Did Miller's deficient performance prejudice Shaw?	Had the amendment challenge been pursued, Shaw likely would have prevailed on appeal, vacating the conviction.	Continued defense time granted nullified prejudice; no effect on outcome.	Yes; Shaw had a reasonable chance of success on the amendment claim, so prejudice exists.
Does AEDPA deferential review apply to state-law strategy claims?	State-law issues under Indiana law should be evaluated for effectiveness under Strickland, not deferred away.	Federal review defers to state court conclusions unless unreasonable under Strickland.	AEDPA deference applied; nonetheless, the Indiana appellate ruling was an unreasonable application of Strickland.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes deficient performance and prejudice standards for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (clarifies when nonfrivolous issues must be raised on appeal)
Haak v. Indiana, 695 N.E.2d 944 (Ind. 1998) (limits substantive amendments to before omnibus date)
Fajardo v. Indiana, 859 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2007) (reaffirms strict substantive/form distinction for amendments to charging information)
Wright v. Indiana, 593 N.E.2d 1192 (Ind. 1992) (supports restriction on amendment identity and substance)
Sharp v. Indiana, 534 N.E.2d 708 (Ind. 1989) (addresses when amendment changes offense identity)