Troy Clark v. Lorie Davis, Director
850 F.3d 770
5th Cir.2017Background
- Troy Clark was convicted of capital murder in Texas (victim Christina Muse) and sentenced to death; trial counsel conducted a limited mitigation investigation and Clark refused to present family witnesses, testifying he wanted the death penalty.
- State habeas counsel (Craig Henry) filed an application containing limited mitigation evidence (a two-page affidavit from Clark’s mother); the state courts denied relief.
- Henry also served as Clark’s federal habeas counsel; in federal proceedings Henry developed a more extensive mitigation record but the district court denied relief on prejudice/AEDPA grounds; this court affirmed and certiorari was denied.
- After the Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan and then Trevino v. Thaler (extending Martinez’s rationale to Texas), new state habeas counsel (OCW) filed a successive state petition presenting extensive mitigation evidence (FAS experts, family affidavits); the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed it as an abuse of the writ.
- Clark then sought Rule 60(b)(6) relief in federal court alleging Henry had an inherent conflict (as both state and federal habeas counsel) and that Trevino/Martinez excused procedural defaults; the district court denied the Rule 60(b)(6) motion as untimely and meritless and declined a COA.
- The Fifth Circuit granted a COA and affirmed, holding Clark’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion was untimely (filed ~16 months after Trevino) and rejecting arguments for excusing the delay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Clark’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is a permissible attack on the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding or an unauthorized successive habeas petition | Clark: the motion alleges a defect in the integrity of proceedings because Henry had a conflict (served as state and federal habeas counsel) and thus could not vindicate Martinez/Trevino-based claims | State: the motion effectively seeks a second chance to relitigate merits and is thus a successive petition barred by AEDPA | Court: To the extent it alleges conflicted counsel undermining integrity, it is not categorically an unauthorized successive petition, but other limits apply |
| Whether Clark’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion was filed within a reasonable time | Clark: the relevant accrual date is when the district court allowed substitution of new federal counsel (May 19, 2014), so his Sept. 19, 2014 filing was timely | State: timeliness should be measured from Trevino (May 28, 2013) or when conflict-free counsel was appointed (Aug. 2013); Clark’s motion—filed ~12–16 months later—was untimely | Court: Held untimely. The relevant accrual date was Trevino (May 28, 2013); filing ~16 months later was not within a reasonable time |
| Whether good cause/excusable delay exists because OCW pursued a state successive petition and because new federal counsel required time to prepare the Rule 60(b) motion | Clark: the nine months OCW spent preparing the state petition and the subsequent four months for new federal counsel should be excused | State: Clark could have filed concurrently in federal court or sought stay; Clark was present at the August 2013 hearing and had reason to act earlier | Court: Rejected excuse; delay not justified because Clark had actual knowledge of the conflict by Aug. 2013 and could have acted sooner |
| Whether Clark showed extraordinary circumstances or merits warranting reopening of judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) | Clark: Trevino/Martinez materially changed law and, coupled with new mitigation evidence, justify relief and reopening | State: A change in decisional law alone is not a Rule 60(b)(6) basis; claims may be successive and time-barred under §2244(d) | Court: Declined to reach in detail because untimeliness alone warranted denial; also noted Gonzalez v. Crosby limits use of Rule 60(b)(6) to circumvent AEDPA and that Martinez/Trevino are not retroactive new constitutional rules |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (recognized limited exception allowing ineffective-assistance-of-state-habeas-counsel to establish cause for procedural default when initial-review collateral proceedings are the first opportunity to raise IATC claims)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (extended Martinez’s rationale to Texas-style procedures where direct appeal does not provide a meaningful opportunity to raise IATC claims)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b) relief is available only to the extent consistent with habeas statutes; cannot be used to circumvent AEDPA’s successive-petition rules)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (federal habeas review under §2254(d)(1) is generally limited to the state-court record)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (pre-Martinez rule: ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel generally does not establish cause for procedural default)
- Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950) (Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances to reopen final judgment)