Troy Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, etc.
202 So. 3d 846
| Fla. | 2016

Background

  • On Sept. 26, 2008 Troy Anderson was robbed, carjacked, and shot in the parking lot of an Embassy Suites in Orlando; he sued Hilton Hotels Corp., W2007 Equity Inns Realty, Interstate Management, and SecurAmerica for negligence.
  • Anderson served separate Rule 1.442/§768.79 proposals to each defendant: Hilton $650,000; W2007 $100,000; Interstate $650,000; SecurAmerica $300,000. Paula Anderson (wife) made near-identical separate proposals for her loss-of-consortium claim but later voluntarily dismissed her claim before trial.
  • At trial, Hilton, W2007, and Interstate were jointly represented and the parties agreed to refer to them collectively as “Embassy Suites”; the jury found Embassy Suites 72% and SecurAmerica 28% negligent and entered a net judgment of $1,225,487.52 against Embassy Suites and $476,578.48 against SecurAmerica.
  • Anderson moved for attorneys’ fees under §768.79 and Rule 1.442; the trial court denied fees, finding Anderson’s offers ambiguous because the term “PLAINTIFF” could be read to include Paula.
  • The Fifth DCA affirmed the denial of fees, relying on its precedent that such offers can be ambiguous when other plaintiffs/claims exist.
  • The Florida Supreme Court granted review, held Anderson’s offers unambiguous, and determined he was entitled to fees because his offers complied with §768.79/Rule 1.442 and his judgments exceeded the offers by more than 25% (including at least as to SecurAmerica individually).

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether Anderson’s proposals were ambiguous because they did not reference Paula Anderson’s pending loss-of-consortium claim Anderson: proposals referred to singular “PLAINTIFF” (Troy Anderson) and thus clearly covered only his claims Defendants: use of generic terms could reasonably be read to affect both Troy and Paula, creating ambiguity Held: Proposals unambiguous; reasonable reading is they covered only Troy’s claims and satisfied §768.79/Rule 1.442 clarity requirement (Nichols standard)
Whether separate offers to multiple defendants must be aggregated or apportioned when judgment is entered collectively against some defendants Anderson: each offer stands on its own; entitlement depends on whether judgment obtained exceeds the single offer by 25% Defendants: judgment against collective “Embassy Suites” cannot be compared to individual offers; aggregation/absence of apportionment defeats fee recovery Held: Offers need not be aggregated; a plaintiff may compare each individual offer to the judgment obtained; where an individual offeree’s offer is exceeded by 25% (e.g., SecurAmerica) fees are available
Whether referring multiple defendants collectively at trial waived entitlement to fees or precluded comparison to offers made to individual defendants Anderson: trial convenience labeling did not alter the statutory fee entitlement tied to offers and judgment amounts Defendants: agreement to treat defendants as one for jury instructions and verdict form undermines comparison to individual offers Held: Collective reference for trial convenience does not negate fee entitlement where statutory requirements met; no waiver of separate offers

Key Cases Cited

  • State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2006) (proposal must be sufficiently clear to allow informed decision; courts should avoid nitpicking)
  • Miley v. Nash, 171 So. 3d 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (offer to a single plaintiff need not address separate plaintiff’s derivative claim to be enforceable)
  • Alamo Fin., L.P. v. Mazoff, 112 So. 3d 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (context controls; offer by single party construed as affecting only that party despite broad language)
  • Land & Sea Petroleum, Inc. v. Bus. Specialists, Inc., 53 So. 3d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (separate but identical offers to multiple defendants can be sufficiently definite)
  • Hibbard ex rel. Carr v. McGraw, 918 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (Fifth DCA precedent finding ambiguity where offer could be read to include multiple plaintiffs)
  • Audiffred v. Arnold, 161 So. 3d 1274 (Fla. 2015) (distinguishable joint-offer facts where offer expressly resolved claims of multiple plaintiffs and lacked apportionment)
  • Hess v. Walton, 898 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (rejecting aggregation of separate offers; each offer judged against judgment obtained)
  • Thornburg v. Pursell, 476 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (improper to combine separate defendants’ offers for comparison to judgment)
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