Troy a Stewart v. Robert Charles Lee
331130
| Mich. Ct. App. | Jun 8, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Troy A. Stewart, jail administrator at Bay County Jail, sued defendant Robert C. Lee (a former deputy and sheriff candidate) for defamation after Lee accused Stewart at a county commissioners’ meeting of committing a felony by bringing a controlled substance into the jail.
- The statements were rebroadcast on local cable (Bay 3 TV) and posted to YouTube and Facebook; Lee later repeated the allegation in a FOIA request.
- Stewart actually brought Peridex (chlorhexidine gluconate), a prescription mouthwash; that ingredient is not a scheduled controlled substance under Michigan law, so the conduct was not a felony.
- The parties agreed Lee’s statement was substantively false; Stewart, as jail administrator, was treated as a public official for defamation purposes.
- To prevail Stewart therefore had to prove actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth) by clear and convincing evidence; the trial court granted summary disposition for Lee, finding no genuine issue on actual malice.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find reckless disregard/actual malice, including Lee’s narcotics-unit background, his confident legalized use of the term “controlled substance,” and campaign motive to “stir the pot.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Stewart, as jail administrator, is a public official for defamation law | Stewart: his role places him in the public-official category | Lee: (implicitly) did not dispute public-official status on appeal | Court: Stewart is a public official (public-official designation applies to those who appear to have substantial responsibility over governmental affairs) |
| Whether Lee’s false accusation was protected or defamatory requiring actual malice | Stewart: Lee acted with actual malice — knowingly false or reckless disregard | Lee: no genuine issue of actual malice; lacked evidence of knowledge/recklessness | Court: jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence; summary disposition for Lee reversed |
| Whether evidence supported reckless disregard for truth (actual malice) | Stewart: Lee had information showing possible falsity, legal knowledge of “controlled substance,” and political motive to inflame | Lee: relied on secondhand reports that an incident occurred; no proof he knew the statement was false | Court: evidence (Lee’s testimony, narcotics experience, explicit campaign motive to “stir the pot,” and confident legal framing) permits a reasonable jury to infer reckless disregard |
| Whether trial court needed to specify which particular statements were defamatory | Stewart: trial court should have specified which aspects were defamatory | Lee: trial court’s general finding was sufficient | Court: although more specificity would be preferable, the trial court’s general conclusion sufficed for issues before it |
Key Cases Cited
- Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 608 (public-official designation for certain government employees)
- J & J Constr. Co. v. Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Local 1, 468 Mich. 722 (actual malice standard for public officials in defamation law)
- Smith v. Anonymous Joint Enterprise, 487 Mich. 102 (deliberate avoidance of truth and reckless disregard standard)
- Ireland v. Edwards, 230 Mich. App. 607 (summary-disposition standard in actual-malice context)
- Kefgen v. Davidson, 241 Mich. App. 611 (evidence may be contested yet still satisfy clear-and-convincing standard)