918 N.W.2d 645
Mich.2017Background
- Plaintiff was hospitalized in the ICU after a 2011 stroke/aneurysm and alleges an aide named Dana dropped her twice while assisting her to the bathroom; injuries included torn rotator cuff and intracranial bleeding.
- Plaintiff filed suit on February 11, 2014, more than two years after the incidents; she did not serve the statutory notice of intent required for malpractice claims.
- Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8), arguing the claims sound in medical malpractice and are time‑barred; the trial court granted the motion.
- The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the pleaded claims sounded in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence.
- The Michigan Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred: when the only material before the court is the complaint, the court must determine the nature of the claims from the complaint alone; it concluded only the claim related to the second drop sounds in ordinary negligence, while the other theories implicate medical judgment and therefore sound in medical malpractice and are time‑barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the claims sound in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence | Trowell argued the complaint pleads ordinary negligence, not malpractice | Hospital argued the allegations implicate medical judgment and thus are malpractice (subject to a 2‑year statute) | Court: Read complaint as whole; only the second drop claim sounds in ordinary negligence; remaining claims implicate medical judgment and sound in medical malpractice |
| Whether the lower courts may consider materials beyond the complaint on this motion | Trowell: nature of claim must be determined from the complaint when only the complaint is before the court | Hospital: court may consider extrinsic evidence under MCR 2.116(C)(7)/(G)(5) | Court: because no extrinsic materials were submitted, review was properly limited to the complaint alone |
| Whether remand for evidentiary development was proper | Trowell opposed remand, arguing pleadings control | Hospital supported plenary fact development to determine nature of claims | Court: remand for evidentiary hearing was improper given the record; Court of Appeals erred in ordering additional discovery to decide the character of the claims when only the complaint was before the court |
| Application to specific theories (staffing, supervision, training, physical handling, second drop) | Trowell: general negligence theories pleaded | Hospital: these theories involve professional judgment and individualized medical assessment | Court: failure to use adequate staffing, failure to supervise, failure to train, and improper assistance implicate medical judgment (malpractice); failure to take corrective action after first drop (the second drop) is ordinary negligence |
Key Cases Cited
- Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr., 471 Mich. 411, 684 N.W.2d 864 (2004) (framework for distinguishing medical malpractice from ordinary negligence)
- Dorris v. Detroit Osteopathic Hosp. Corp., 460 Mich. 26, 594 N.W.2d 455 (1999) (staffing and professional‑management decisions implicate medical judgment)
- Patterson v. Kleiman, 447 Mich. 429, 526 N.W.2d 879 (1994) (on materials courts may consider when deciding MCR 2.116(C)(7) motions)
- Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999) (standard for evaluating pleadings on MCR 2.116(C)(8) motions)