Trondo L. Humphrey v. State of Indiana, 2017 Ind. LEXIS 342

Background

In 1996 Trondo L. Humphrey was convicted of murder and sentenced to 60 years for the 1995 killing of Benjamin Laughlin. The conviction rested largely on Roosevelt Brooks’ unsworn pretrial written statement in which Brooks identified Humphrey as the shooter.
At trial Brooks recanted and testified inconsistently; the prosecution introduced his prior unsworn written statement over a foundation objection (not a hearsay objection). The trial court gave a standard jury instruction stating prior inconsistent statements may be used both for impeachment and as substantive evidence.
Defense counsel did not object on hearsay grounds, did not request a limiting/admonition instruction limiting the prior statement to impeachment only, and affirmatively declined to object to the erroneous jury instruction. Defense counsel also emphasized Brooks’ statement during trial and closing.
On direct appeal this Court affirmed the conviction but noted that a proper objection to the instruction would have required the trial court to entertain it; no ineffective-assistance claim was then raised.
Fifteen years later Humphrey filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance for: failing to object on hearsay grounds; failing to request a limiting instruction; and failing to object to or propose a correct instruction on prior inconsistent statements. The post-conviction court denied relief; the Court of Appeals reversed on the substantive claims and this Court granted transfer.
The Indiana Supreme Court (majority) concluded counsel’s performance was objectively deficient (failure to object on hearsay, failure to secure a limiting instruction, allowing an incorrect instruction), and that the errors were prejudicial because Brooks’ written statement was the only evidence directly identifying Humphrey as the shooter. The Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Court of Appeals’ laches ruling (that the petition was not barred) was summarily affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Humphrey)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to Brooks’ unsworn written statement on hearsay grounds	Counsel’s failure to object on hearsay grounds allowed inadmissible out-of-court statements to be considered substantively	Once foundation objection failed, counsel reasonably declined further objections to avoid drawing attention; admission would have occurred anyway	Held: Counsel’s failure was deficient; Modesitt/Rule 801 made the unsworn statement inadmissible as substantive evidence absent hearsay exception
Whether counsel was ineffective for not requesting a limiting/admonishment instruction under Evidence Rule 105	Counsel should have asked the jury to be admonished to consider Brooks’ prior statement only for impeachment to prevent substantive use	Requesting a limiting instruction would have highlighted the damaging statement and undermined defense strategy	Held: Failure to request limiting instruction was deficient because it permitted jury to use the statement substantively
Whether counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the jury instruction that allowed prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence	Defense erred by allowing an incorrect statement of law (pattern instruction inconsistent with Rule 801/Modesitt)	Counsel’s acceptance was strategic; pattern instruction was routine and both parties waived objection	Held: Counsel’s assent to the incorrect instruction was deficient; the instruction misstated the law and should have been challenged
Whether Humphrey was prejudiced by counsel’s errors (Strickland prejudice prong)	Without Brooks’ written statement there is no direct evidence identifying Humphrey as the shooter; the verdict is unreliable and a new trial likely would have produced a different result	The jury heard other testimony and sworn statements that connected Brooks’ trial testimony to in-court admissions; even with objection the statement likely would have been admitted or its substance proven	Held: Prejudice proved — Brooks’ unsworn statement was the only direct ID evidence; excluding it undermines confidence in the verdict; a reasonable probability exists that outcome would differ, so new trial ordered

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Modesitt v. State, 578 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. 1991) (overruled Patterson; adopted rule excluding prior unsworn statements as substantive evidence)
Patterson v. State, 324 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 1975) (previous rule permitting prior out‑of‑court unsworn statements as substantive evidence; later overruled)
Humphrey v. State (Humphrey I), 680 N.E.2d 836 (Ind. 1997) (direct‑appeal opinion noting admission of Brooks’ statement and that a proper objection to the instruction would have been entertained)
Banks v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1126 (Ind. 1991) (failure to timely object allows otherwise inadmissible impeachment evidence to be considered substantively)
Webster v. State, 413 N.E.2d 898 (Ind. 1980) (when evaluating sufficiency, exclude impeachment‑only evidence from substantive case)
McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389 (Ind. 2002) (reiterating Strickland standard and strong presumption of reasonable counsel)
Appleton v. State, 740 N.E.2d 122 (Ind. 2001) (prior inconsistent statements may be superfluous and improper if used to admit substantive facts)