Trometter v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
147 A.3d 601
Pa. Commw. Ct.2016Background
- Petitioner Mary Trometter, a PSEA member, filed a sworn report under 34 Pa. Code §95.112 alleging NEA/PSEA used member-dues-funded activity (letters, a magazine endorsement, and transfers to a SuperPAC) to support Tom Wolf’s 2013 gubernatorial campaign in violation of Section 1701 of PERA.
- Section 1701 (PERA) prohibits employee organizations from making contributions to political parties/candidates, requires reporting of violations to the Board, authorizes the Board to adopt rules to prevent evasion, and prescribes civil fines and criminal penalties for willful violations.
- The Labor Relations Board acknowledged the charge, received answers from the unions, but did not independently investigate the allegations.
- Six months later the Board issued an order transferring Trometter’s report to the Office of Attorney General pursuant to its regulation 34 Pa. Code §95.112(c), without resolving the substantive legal questions.
- Trometter petitioned for review, arguing the Board has statutory authority and duty under PERA §1701 to investigate and enforce, that the Board’s blanket referral to the Attorney General was improper, and that §95.112 is inconsistent with PERA.
- The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board: it held the General Assembly vested enforcement authority over §1701 in the Board, invalidated the Board’s delegation by regulation to the Attorney General (except for criminal prosecutions), and remanded for the Board to exercise its enforcement duties.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Trometter) | Defendant's Argument (Board) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Board has authority to investigate/enforce §1701 of PERA | Board is empowered by PERA §1701 and §501 to enforce §1701 and adopt rules preventing evasion | Board lacks investigatory authority for §1701 because §1601 limits its investigatory powers to representation/unfair practice disputes | Court held Board does have statutory duty and authority to enforce §1701; §1601 does not preclude that duty |
| Validity of 34 Pa. Code §95.112 (regulation referring complaints to AG) | §95.112 improperly delegates Board’s enforcement duty to the Attorney General | Regulation is a permissible implementation of §1701 and Board practice | Court held §95.112 is invalid to the extent it authorizes delegation of the Board’s enforcement duties to the AG (except for criminal referrals) |
| Whether the Board properly transferred the entire matter to the Attorney General | Transfer was premature and abdicated the Board’s statutory responsibilities | Transfer appropriate because AG handles enforcement and prosecution under Commonwealth Attorneys Act | Court held the Board abused its discretion; transfer without Board inquiry was improper and inconsistent with PERA; referral only appropriate for criminal prosecution after Board inquiry |
| Scope of permissible referral to Attorney General | Any referral must be limited to criminal matters after Board determines potential willful violations | Board may refer complaints under its regulation broadly to AG | Court held referral may be made to AG only for potential criminal prosecutions (willful violations); civil/adjudicative enforcement belongs to Board |
Key Cases Cited
- Walker v. Eleby, 842 A.2d 389 (Pa. 2004) (statutory interpretation starts with plain meaning)
- Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 676 A.2d 711 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (statutory ambiguity when language reasonably susceptible to multiple meanings)
- Commonwealth v. Beam, 788 A.2d 357 (Pa. 2002) (statutory scheme can implicitly confer enforcement authority)
- Mercury Trucking, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 55 A.3d 1056 (Pa. 2012) (distinguishing administrative proceedings from actions at law)
- Town of McCandless v. Bellisario, 709 A.2d 379 (Pa. 1998) (criminal prosecutions must proceed under criminal procedure rules)
- Popowsky v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 910 A.2d 38 (Pa. 2006) (agency regulation cannot be inconsistent with legislative intent)