TRK, LLC v. Vivian Myles
214 So. 3d 191
| Miss. | 2017Background
- Vivian Myles (mother) filed a wrongful-death suit after her son Enrique Myles was killed; she believed she was the sole heir.
- After suit, it was revealed Enrique had a minor child (LJW); LJW (through her mother) sought to intervene and later moved to be substituted as plaintiff.
- Defendants argued Vivian lacked standing because a surviving child (LJW) is the proper wrongful-death beneficiary and the suit must be dismissed rather than corrected by substitution.
- The circuit court denied defendants’ summary-judgment motion, granted substitution of LJW as plaintiff, and refused to dismiss for lack of standing; defendants appealed interlocutorily.
- On appeal the Court considered (a) whether Vivian had standing to file despite a surviving child, (b) whether substitution was permissible, and (c) ancillary procedural issues (estoppel, contempt for filing a second suit during the stay, and allocation of costs).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Vivian (mother) have standing to file the wrongful-death action when decedent was survived by a child? | Vivian (and appellees) argued any listed relative may initiate the suit under the statute; standing to file is distinct from entitlement to recover damages. | Defendants argued only those entitled to recover (priority categories) may file; a surviving child excludes a parent’s standing. | Held: Vivian had standing. The statute permits any listed relative to bring suit; the priority rules govern recovery, not standing. |
| If original plaintiff lacked standing, must court dismiss or may it substitute the proper plaintiff? | Substitution is appropriate to cure any party-defect; trial court properly substituted LJW. | Defendants insisted lack of standing requires dismissal and substitution cannot cure the jurisdictional defect. | Held: Substitution was permissible; the circuit court did not err in granting substitution. |
| Are LJW or Vivian judicially/equitably estopped from defending standing after previously agreeing to dismiss? | LJW later argued Vivian had standing and sought to defend the trial court’s ruling. | Defendants contended inconsistent positions should bar their argument under estoppel doctrines. | Held: Estoppel doctrines do not apply; the Court had not accepted a prior position that benefited LJW and no one reasonably relied to their detriment. |
| Did LJW violate the Court’s stay by filing a new complaint and warrant contempt or costs? | LJW said she filed a new complaint to protect statute-of-limitations rights and the stay applied only to the original cause number. | Defendants sought contempt and sanctions for filing during the stay. | Held: No contempt. The stay applied to the specific cause number; filing a separate complaint did not violate this Court’s stay; no sanctions awarded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burley v. Douglas, 26 So. 3d 1013 (Miss. 2009) (holds statute distinguishes who may file suit from who may recover; any listed relative may initiate a wrongful-death action)
- Logan v. Durham, 95 So. 2d 227 (Miss. 1957) (older case addressing distribution/recovery priority among beneficiaries; did not decide who may file)
- Partyka v. Yazoo Dev. Corp., 376 So. 2d 646 (Miss. 1979) (affirmed dismissal in context of recovery priority but analysis focused on entitlement to damages rather than standing to file)
- Estate of Moreland, 537 So. 2d 1337 (Miss. 1989) (concerned appointment of administrator and discussed wrongful-death distribution principles; not dispositive on filing standing)