Tristan Coomes v. Edmonds School District No 15
816 F.3d 1255
9th Cir.2016Background
- Tristan Coomes was the manager and primary teacher of Meadowdale Middle School’s Emotional/Behavioral Disorders (EBD) program and worked there four years.
- Coomes repeatedly complained to supervisors and parents that EBD students were improperly denied mainstream placements and that administrators mistreated staff/students.
- Her evaluations deteriorated after these disputes; she was reassigned, went on medical leave, and her employment was processed as separated after her counsel declared she would not return.
- Coomes sued the Edmonds School District and two administrators in federal court asserting First Amendment retaliation and various Washington state claims, including wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on federal and state claims; Coomes appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of her First Amendment claim but vacated and remanded the wrongful-discharge claim in light of a subsequent Washington Supreme Court decision (Rose) altering state-law analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Coomes spoke as a private citizen or a public employee for First Amendment protection | Coomes contends her complaints about EBD placement decisions and administrator misconduct were matters of public concern and made as a citizen, not pursuant to official duties | District argues her communications (to supervisors and parents) were within her job duties as EBD manager/IEP case manager and thus unprotected under Garcetti | Held for District: her complaints to administrators were "up-the-chain-of-command" job-related speech and communications with parents about IEPs fell within her duties; not protected |
| Whether the speech was a substantial/motivating factor in adverse actions | Coomes argues retaliation followed her protected speech | District contends adverse actions were unrelated or justified by performance and managerial concerns | Court did not reach this after resolving the duty/speech issue against Coomes; summary judgment for District on First Amendment claim affirmed |
| Whether federal summary judgment was properly granted given record issues of fact | Coomes argues genuine disputes of material fact exist about scope of duties and harassment | District points to job description, emails, and record showing duties included IEP management and parent communication | Held for District: Coomes failed to designate sufficient specific facts to create a triable issue on scope-of-duty question |
| Whether Coomes’ wrongful-discharge (WA law) claim should be dismissed when alternative statutory remedies exist | Coomes contended wrongful-discharge claim should proceed despite statutory schemes protecting students/employees | District relied on pre-Rose Washington precedent requiring adequacy-of-alternative-remedies showing to bar wrongful-discharge claims | Held: District court judgment vacated as Rose overruled the "adequacy of alternative remedies" bar; wrongful-discharge claim remanded for reconsideration (and the district court should consider exercising supplemental jurisdiction) |
Key Cases Cited
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (speech pursuant to official duties is not protected by the First Amendment)
- Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014) (speech concerning information acquired by virtue of public employment is not automatically employee speech; key test is whether speech is ordinarily within the scope of duties)
- Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009) (five-factor framework for public-employee First Amendment retaliation claims)
- Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (guidance on scope-of-duty inquiry and relevance of chain-of-command complaints)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard — view evidence in nonmovant's favor)
- Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co., 358 P.3d 1139 (Wash. 2015) (overruled prior Washington rule; existence of alternative statutory remedies does not bar wrongful-discharge claims)