Trisha A. v. Department of Child safety/l.A./l.A.
247 Ariz. 84
| Ariz. | 2019Background
- Mother had two children removed after substance-abuse-related dependency findings; DCS provided services over ~16 months but Mother largely failed to engage.
- DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights; Mother received notice that missing certain hearings could result in waiver and an accelerated hearing.
- Mother missed a January combined status/pretrial conference; the juvenile court, finding no good cause, proceeded under Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 64(C) to an accelerated severance hearing and terminated parental rights.
- Mother moved under Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 46(E) (incorporating Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60) to set aside the judgment, claiming she had entered inpatient treatment the day of the hearing; the juvenile court initially set aside the judgment then reinstated it after finding no good cause.
- The court of appeals vacated, holding that requiring a meritorious defense to set aside a Rule 64(C) judgment violated due process; the Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mother) | Defendant's Argument (DCS) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 46(E) requires a showing of a meritorious defense to set aside a severance judgment entered after a Rule 64(C) accelerated hearing | Rule 46(E) should not import a meritorious-defense requirement; only good cause should be required | Rule 46(E) explicitly incorporates Civ. R. 60(b) and Arizona caselaw requires a meritorious defense to set aside final judgments | Yes. A movant must show good cause for absence and a meritorious defense under Rule 46(E) (via Civ. R. 60(b) and precedent) |
| Whether the meritorious-defense requirement applied in this context violates a parent's due process rights (Mathews balancing) | Requiring a meritorious defense imposes an undue and constitutionally impermissible burden given the stakes and the risks of accelerated hearings | The meritorious-defense requirement is a minimal burden and does not increase risk of erroneous deprivation; it protects finality and children's interests in permanency | No. The requirement does not violate due process; burden is minimal and justified by state/child interests |
| Whether the “good cause” standard differs across Rules 64(C), 65(C), and 66(D)(2) | Good-cause review before finding waiver should suffice; standards differ because hearings and rights at stake differ | The rules share identical or substantially similar language; consistent interpretation is appropriate | The Court holds the good-cause standard should be interpreted consistently across those rules |
| Whether the Court should decide the constitutionality of Rule 64(C) accelerated severance hearings | Mother raised procedural-due-process concerns tied to Rule 64(C) | DCS defended Rule 64(C) procedure | The Court declined to address Rule 64(C) constitutionality because the issue was not properly raised on appeal; it assumed constitutionality for purposes of the decision |
Key Cases Cited
- Christy A. v. Arizona Dep't of Economic Security, 217 Ariz. 299 (App. 2007) (applied meritorious-defense requirement to default at final severance hearings)
- Brenda D. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437 (2018) (interpreting failure-to-appear rules and procedures for late appearance at termination hearings)
- Gonzalez v. Nguyen, 243 Ariz. 531 (2018) (explaining courts have consistently required a meritorious defense to obtain relief under Civ. R. 60)
- Richas v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 512 (1982) (describing meritorious defense requirement in setting aside default judgments)
- Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353 (1984) (same; applying meritorious-defense requirement to Civ. R. 60)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (factors for procedural due process balancing)
- Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (parental-rights due process principles)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parental rights as fundamental liberty interest; need for fundamentally fair procedures)