Trinco Investment Company v. United States
130 Fed. Cl. 592
| Fed. Cl. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs Trin-Co own five non-contiguous timberland parcels adjacent to or surrounded by Shasta‑Trinity National Forest in Trinity County, California; alleged damage arose from the 2008 Iron Complex wildfires (notably the Cedar and Eagle Fires).
- The U.S. Forest Service directed firefighting that included indirect attack/backburning; Forest Service admits it backburned all of V&M Bottoms and part of Mud Springs; the extent of backburning on other parcels is disputed.
- Plaintiffs sued for a taking; the trial court initially dismissed, the Federal Circuit reversed (Trin Co II) holding the necessity defense is not automatic and requires an actual emergency, imminent danger, and a response that is actually necessary.
- After discovery the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; plaintiffs sought to exclude two of the government’s experts (Perkins and Stanich) under Daubert/FRE 702 and to establish liability; defendant invoked the necessity defense and disputed that backburning caused plaintiffs’ losses.
- The court denied exclusion of the government experts, finding their experience and analyses sufficiently reliable, but concluded genuine disputes of material fact exist on all three elements of the necessity defense and on the extent of backburning versus wildfire spread, so summary judgment for either side was inappropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Perkins and Stanich (Daubert/FRE 702) | Experts are unreliable, subjective, lack peer‑review and independent analysis | Experts are experienced practitioners; methodology and documentary/field analysis are reliable; Daubert is flexible | Denied exclusion; experts admitted — their deficiencies go to weight, not admissibility |
| Existence of an "actual emergency" | No actual emergency existed at times/property locations when takings allegedly occurred | Iron Complex fires and contemporaneous data show an actual emergency statewide and locally | Genuine dispute of material fact; cannot resolve on summary judgment |
| Imminent danger to life/property at times of alleged takings | No imminent danger at relevant times/locations; plaintiffs’ experts say fire behavior was moderated | Contemporaneous records and govt experts show imminent threats in many areas | Genuine dispute of material fact; cannot resolve on summary judgment |
| Whether backburning was "actually necessary" (reasonableness/availability of alternatives) | Necessity requires the action be the only feasible option; alternatives existed, so necessity fails | Necessity requires a reasonable response judged at the time given available information; indirect attack/backburning were reasonable under constraints | Genuine dispute of material fact on reasonableness/necessity and on which acres were caused by backburning vs advancing fire; summary judgment denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Trin Co. Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (necessity defense requires actual emergency, imminent danger, and an ‘‘actually necessary’’ response)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial court gatekeeper role for expert reliability)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (Daubert factors are flexible; experience‑based experts admissible)
- Brewer v. State, 341 P.3d 1107 (Alaska 2014) (applies Trin Co II to wildfires; necessity judged at the time of taking)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; do not weigh evidence at motion stage)
- Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Daubert‑style analysis required for expert testimony)
- Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879) (necessity/warmer historical application of doctrine)
- Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding destruction as necessary to prevent greater public harm)