TrinCo Investment Co. v. United States
722 F.3d 1375
| Fed. Cir. | 2013Background
- TrinCo Investment Co. and Kathleen G. Rose own several timbered parcels adjacent to the Shasta–Trinity National Forest in California; about 1,782 acres of merchantable timber across their properties were burned in July–August 2008.
- The U.S. Forest Service intentionally lit fires on and adjacent to TrinCo’s land during the 2008 "Iron Complex" response to reduce unburned fuel; TrinCo alleges these burns destroyed timber valued at ~$6.6 million.
- TrinCo sued in the Court of Federal Claims for a Fifth Amendment taking, seeking compensation for the loss of timber.
- The Government moved to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(6), arguing the doctrine of necessity bars liability for property destruction undertaken to fight fires.
- The CFC granted dismissal; on appeal the Federal Circuit reviewed whether TrinCo pleaded sufficient facts to state a plausible takings claim and whether the necessity doctrine applied as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether TrinCo pleaded a plausible Fifth Amendment takings claim | TrinCo: complaint alleges intentional burning by Forest Service destroyed merchantable timber and gave facts supporting liability | Govt: any government action to fight or prevent fire is privileged by the necessity doctrine, so no compensable taking | Reversed — complaint pleads sufficient facts to be facially plausible; dismissal premature |
| Scope of the necessity doctrine as a categorical bar | TrinCo: necessity requires actual emergency and imminent danger; not every fire-control act is privileged | Govt: necessity absolves government of liability for property destruction in fire-control efforts | Necessity is a fact-dependent defense requiring imminent danger/actual emergency; cannot be applied categorically at pleading stage |
| Whether the alleged facts show an actual emergency/imminent danger justifying noncompensable seizure | TrinCo: facts do not establish imminence or necessity for burning private timber; only ~2% of forest burned at the time | Govt: (contends) firefighting tactics justified the burns | Court: current pleadings do not establish those prerequisites; factual inquiry required |
| Appropriateness of 12(b)(6) dismissal based on necessity | TrinCo: factual issues preclude resolving necessity on the pleadings | Govt: necessity doctrine supports dismissal now | Court: reversal — dismissal improper; remand for factual development |
Key Cases Cited
- Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (common-law necessity may excuse destruction to stop spread of fire)
- United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (wartime destruction justified by imminent enemy threat may be noncompensable)
- Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (discussing necessity doctrine in takings context)
- Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386 (necessity/right to raze to prevent conflagration)
- Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 (necessity requires immediate, impending danger)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading must permit reasonable inference of liability)
- Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900 (California: noncompensable government damage limited to emergency conditions)