Trim Masters, Inc. v. Eva Beth Roby, 2016 SC 000451

Eva Beth Roby, an assembler, sustained a repetitive-trauma right upper-extremity injury manifesting April 22, 2011; she underwent surgery and was restricted from repetitive right-arm use and lifting over 10 pounds.
At injury time Roby was in her 30s, had only a high-school education, and had past jobs requiring repetitive upper-extremity use; she stopped working after October 2011 and later enrolled full-time in a nursing program.
Medical evidence: Dr. Gabriel imposed work restrictions; Dr. Bilkey concurred and assessed a 6% permanent impairment. Vocational expert William Ellis opined Roby is totally disabled pending improvement; employer submitted a vocational evaluation noting Roby’s nursing enrollment and job descriptions requiring constant hand use.
The ALJ (AW) found Roby permanently and totally disabled (PTD). The Workers’ Compensation Board repeatedly vacated and remanded the AW’s opinions for inadequate explanation of how Roby’s age and college enrollment affected the PTD finding.
The Court of Appeals reinstated the AW, finding the Board improperly substituted its judgment for the AW. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding the AW’s PTD finding was supported by substantial evidence and his opinion was sufficient.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the AW’s PTD finding was supported by substantial evidence	Roby: medical restrictions, 6% impairment, vocational opinion that she cannot perform work now — supports PTD	Trim Masters: AW failed to account for Roby’s age and active pursuit of a nursing degree which could enable future work	Court: AW’s PTD finding was supported by substantial evidence and not unreasonable under the record
Whether the AW’s written opinion adequately explained his reasoning	Roby: AW set forth evidence, credibility findings, and explained why she could not work now	Trim Masters/Board: AW gave conclusory statements, did not explain how age/college enrollment affected disability	Court: AW’s opinion was sufficient—implications about age and education were inferable; Board erred by making independent factfinding

Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1985) (AW has discretion to evaluate and weigh evidence and assess witness credibility)
Gibbs v. Premier Scale Co./Indiana Scale Co., 50 S.W.3d 754 (Ky. 2001) (claimant bears burden to prove extent and duration of disability)
Whittaker v. Rowland, 998 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1999) (standard for review: whether ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence)
Ira A. Watson Dept. Store v. Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d 48 (Ky. 2000) (factors for PTD analysis include post-injury physical, emotional, intellectual, and vocational status)
Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d 56 (Ky. 2012) (opinions must summarize conflicting evidence and state evidentiary basis to enable review)
Shields v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Min. Co., 634 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. App. 1982) (ALJ not required to recount record line-by-line)
Big Sandy Cmty. Action Program v. Chaffins, 502 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1973) (ALJ duty to state findings)
Bullock v. Goodwill Coal Co., 214 S.W.3d 890 (Ky. 2007) (abuse of discretion defined)
Kentucky Nat. Park Comm’n v. Russell, 191 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1945) (historical definition of abuse of discretion)
Osborne v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1968) (PTD inquiry contemplates individualized assessment of ability to find sustained work)